Making War to Keep Peace by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Page A

understanding of the size trength, and character of the enemy helped his team make accurate estimates of what would be needed to defeat Saddam. And no asset was more important than his personal clarity about U.S. goals in the Gulf. He was determined to avoid the damaging and demoralizing incrementalism of the Vietnam War, with its endless wrangling in and out of Congress.
    In the Vietnam War, the search for a political solution had become an excuse for deferring needed military replenishments and not seeking victory. In fact, the very idea of winning had been discouraged in many quarters as evidence of an insufficient interest in peace or a parochial concern with strictly national perspectives.
    In the Gulf conflict, Bush emphasized from the outset that if Saddam refused to withdraw completely and unconditionally from Kuwait, it would be necessary to defeat him definitively. Bush rejected any suggestion that avoiding the use of force and finding a political solution should be the goal of negotiations. He declined to become involved in endless negotiations, even when they were promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev, with whom he was working to develop relations. His refusal must have been frustrating to Saddam, who was accustomed to the tactics of endless delay common in the diplomacy of his region. A French diplomat of my acquaintance observed, “Saddam didn’t understand that he was dealing with Anglo-Saxons. He thought he was in a game that could go on forever.”
    Bush signaled that a full force would be assembled, equipped, and utilized from the outset. He stated clearly that there would be no sanctuary. Although various UN diplomats and coalition members urged that attacks be limited to Kuwait, which would have ensured that Iraq suffered no damage, Bush refused to discuss such restrictions. If war came, the coalition would strike at the heart of Saddam’s power—inside Iraq.
    At every stage—at home and abroad—Bush encountered questions, debate, and opposition; one by one, he overcame them.
    THE WAR BEGINS—FOR AMERICANS
    On January 16, 1991, Bush announced that allied air forces, as he called them, had begun attacks in Iraq and Kuwait. “The twenty-eight countries with forces in the Gulf area have exhausted all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful resolution,” he told the nation, “and have no choice but to drive Saddam from Kuwait by force.” 67 He promised that Saddam’s nuclear and chemical potential would be destroyed and that Iraqi forces would leave Kuwait. “The legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place and Kuwait will once again be free.” 68 Noting the five-month delay, he acknowledged flatly that “while the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and plundered a tiny nation no threat to his own.” He quoted a U.S. Army lieutenant: “If we let him get away with this, who knows what’s going to be next.” 69
    Bush did not micromanage the war; he operated on the principlethat military decisions should be left to the military. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell, and the force commanders made the strategic and tactical military decisions. Bush concentrated on dealing with the heads of state in the coalition, with Congress, and with the American people.
    Throughout, Bush proved himself a man of great steadiness who sat at his own center of gravity and communicated confidence in the goals he set for the nation and the coalition. His confidence was contagious and he turned in a remarkable performance, supported by the dazzling power and precision of America’s high-tech weaponry, its highly professional military forces, and effective leadership in the Pentagon. Together, they buried the ghost of Vietnam in the desert of Kuwait.
    THE WAR ENDS—FOR THE COALITION
    In approximately one hundred hours, coalition forces captured 73,700 square