Making War to Keep Peace by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

officials speculated that by convening in the one international arena that excluded Americans, the Europeans meant to take the decision for war or peace out of the hands of the Bush administration. The EC had no tradition of common action on foreign affairs, so why did Germany—which had accepted no significant responsibility with regard to the Gulf crisis—suddenly seek to play a major role?
    The Bush administration reacted cautiously, fearing that Saddam would perceive the European initiative—which called for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait in exchange for assurances that the United States forces would not launch attacks on Iraq—as evidence of disunity in the coalition. In fact, there were potentially important differences between the United States and Europe with regard to the Gulf—differences that would not become clear until the question of ending the war arose.
    Such divergences of policy had existed between the United States and its Franco-German allies from the outset of the crisis. In part these differences were a matter of style, but they stemmed from the fact that the Europeans were simply less indignant about the destruction of Kuwait. They were less concerned about the danger Saddam posed to stability in the Gulf, less committed to Israel, and less interested in engendering a new world order. These factors led some European governments to resist making a major commitment of money and people to the effort; Washington, in turn, found its confidence in the solidarity of some of its allies wavering.
    François Mitterrand sought to draw Saddam into negotiations on Kuwait with promises of a conference on Arab-Israeli settlements, which Israel and the United States opposed and most Arab states supported. Mitterrand pledged that France would be willing to discuss all Middle Eastern problems at one or more international conferences once Iraq had withdrawn from Kuwait. “With Kuwait under occupation,” he said, “nothing is possible. With Kuwait evacuated, everything is possible.” 65
    But neither the United States nor Israel would acquiesce in a deal that linked the Gulf War’s end to regional initiatives unrelated to Iraq’s invasion. The United States had long opposed an international conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict, but supported direct negotiations betweenIsrael and her neighbors, as called for in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
    Efforts to find a negotiated settlement to the Kuwait occupation intensified as the January 15 deadline approached. Some urged the United States to strike a deal that would permit Saddam to save face. The U.S. government took the position that this was exactly what we should not do. There should be a price for invading, occupying, and devastating a neighboring country—and it should include losing face.
    Americans argued that Saddam and Iraq, having trashed Kuwait, disrupted the region, cost the United States more than $30 billion, and cost other members of the coalition perhaps $30 billion more, should not be permitted to walk away without a substantial penalty. At the very least, Saddam would have to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait and compensate his victims and their allies for the economic costs of his violence. He could not undo the human misery and death, but he could provide the financial compensation called for by Resolution 674. 66
    France and Germany agreed that Iraq must honor the UN demand to withdraw, but Mitterrand told the General Assembly that after Saddam released foreign hostages and announced his intention to withdraw, negotiations between Iraq and the coalition could begin on the withdrawal’s timing and related details. The United States—and the UN resolution—said there could be negotiations only after “complete and unconditional” withdrawal of Iraqi forces and the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.
    Meanwhile, Bush focused on winning the war. His