lobbyists for cities, counties, states, right-to-lifers and freedom of choice advocates, consumer groups, political consultants, pollsters, public relations firms. They all moved in. Politics became a full-time industry for tens of thousands of people. In addition, millions of grass-roots voters poured into Washington when their pet issues came up. Voters inundated Congress with oceans of mail, and Congressmen sent back their own unbelievable volumes of mail. The growth of activity in every area was exponential—and it swamped the political system.
Watergate was the epicenter of that political earthquake, but the tremors of reform had been rumbling through the political parties and through Congress in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For a decade, a climate of congressional bitterness and mistrust had developed toward the executive branch. It was fed by the Vietnam War; it was confirmed by the confrontations with President Nixon over money—Congress had legally voted to spend money on domestic programs, but Nixon impounded the money and defiantly refused to spend it. This atmosphere of distrust was climaxed by the investigation of the Nixon campaign’s criminal break-in at the Democratic headquarters located in the Watergate complex, and by disclosures of the multimillion-dollar Nixon campaign slush funds, financed by wealthy corporations.
In revolt, Congress vigorously asserted its authority and its independence from the White House and then armed itself for a prolonged seige against the executive branch. In reaction to Johnson’s escalation of the war in Vietnam without any congressional declaration of war, Congress in 1973 passed the War Powers Resolution requiring any president to obtain congressional approval for commitment of American forces to a combat zone for more than ninety days. Alarmed by Central Intelligence Agency operations such as attempts at assassinating foreign leaders, Congress asserted new oversight authority, requiring notice of all CIA covert operations. To check presidential authority further, Congress demanded that all executive branch agreements with other countries—those below the status of formal treaties—get Senate approval. All these restrictions hemmed in presidential power.
In reaction to the taint of Nixon’s corporate campaign slush funds, Congress voted for public financing of presidential elections. In reaction to its own budget conflict with President Nixon, Congress passed the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, to bar future presidents from refusing to spend what Congress voted. That law also set up a new Congressional budget process and established the CongressionalBudget Office (CBO) to produce independent analysis of the economy and budget; Congress no longer had to depend on administration economists.
That single change—an independent Congressional Budget Office—was crucial, and symptomatic. Such congressional power was unthinkable in the era of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. When I arrived in Washington in 1962, Congress simply accepted the administration’s economic figures. Arguments were over policy, rarely over the facts. From a distance, the significance may be hard to appreciate. But when Congress got its own economic experts and facts, the executive branch was much more often thrown on the defensive.
“The creation of CBO was of fundamental importance in terms of the way power operates in Washington,” insisted Stuart Eizenstat, who felt its power as domestic policy chief in the Carter White House.
“One can trace from the time of the New Deal through the early and mid-parts of the Nixon Administration, a clear, gradual, perceptible increase in presidential power relative to the legislative branch,” Eizenstat pointed out. “The creation of CBO began to redress the balance of power. It did that via one fundamental way—it ended the president’s monopoly on information, on budget forecasts, on economic forecasts. The fact is that the CBO
Watergate was the epicenter of that political earthquake, but the tremors of reform had been rumbling through the political parties and through Congress in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For a decade, a climate of congressional bitterness and mistrust had developed toward the executive branch. It was fed by the Vietnam War; it was confirmed by the confrontations with President Nixon over money—Congress had legally voted to spend money on domestic programs, but Nixon impounded the money and defiantly refused to spend it. This atmosphere of distrust was climaxed by the investigation of the Nixon campaign’s criminal break-in at the Democratic headquarters located in the Watergate complex, and by disclosures of the multimillion-dollar Nixon campaign slush funds, financed by wealthy corporations.
In revolt, Congress vigorously asserted its authority and its independence from the White House and then armed itself for a prolonged seige against the executive branch. In reaction to Johnson’s escalation of the war in Vietnam without any congressional declaration of war, Congress in 1973 passed the War Powers Resolution requiring any president to obtain congressional approval for commitment of American forces to a combat zone for more than ninety days. Alarmed by Central Intelligence Agency operations such as attempts at assassinating foreign leaders, Congress asserted new oversight authority, requiring notice of all CIA covert operations. To check presidential authority further, Congress demanded that all executive branch agreements with other countries—those below the status of formal treaties—get Senate approval. All these restrictions hemmed in presidential power.
In reaction to the taint of Nixon’s corporate campaign slush funds, Congress voted for public financing of presidential elections. In reaction to its own budget conflict with President Nixon, Congress passed the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, to bar future presidents from refusing to spend what Congress voted. That law also set up a new Congressional budget process and established the CongressionalBudget Office (CBO) to produce independent analysis of the economy and budget; Congress no longer had to depend on administration economists.
That single change—an independent Congressional Budget Office—was crucial, and symptomatic. Such congressional power was unthinkable in the era of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. When I arrived in Washington in 1962, Congress simply accepted the administration’s economic figures. Arguments were over policy, rarely over the facts. From a distance, the significance may be hard to appreciate. But when Congress got its own economic experts and facts, the executive branch was much more often thrown on the defensive.
“The creation of CBO was of fundamental importance in terms of the way power operates in Washington,” insisted Stuart Eizenstat, who felt its power as domestic policy chief in the Carter White House.
“One can trace from the time of the New Deal through the early and mid-parts of the Nixon Administration, a clear, gradual, perceptible increase in presidential power relative to the legislative branch,” Eizenstat pointed out. “The creation of CBO began to redress the balance of power. It did that via one fundamental way—it ended the president’s monopoly on information, on budget forecasts, on economic forecasts. The fact is that the CBO
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