Return to Winter: Russia, China, and the New Cold War Against America by Douglas E. Schoen, Melik Kaylan Page B
Authors: Douglas E. Schoen, Melik Kaylan
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with rule by cliques, closed networks, and mafias.
Add up these elements and you get strong clues to why Western social and political principles pose an active threat to the Axis nations. You also get a definitive explanation for the kind of messages the Axis feeds to its citizens at home and allies abroad: a tacit ideology heavy with pressure to conform. Axis propaganda derives directly from the systemic weaknesses in Russia and China, and from the need to hide them while offering compensatory illusions.
One such illusion is nostalgia for national greatness—in a word, nationalism, which Axis elites use more and more frequently to rally their domestic populations. The purpose and the effect of this dangerous tool we all know from historical precedents.
The notion of national greatness is part of a broader illusion involving a theme of conservatism at home and abroad—a pivotal development that the West has yet to notice or address. Meanwhile, the true activating principle of the state is continuity in power, with all the methods of modern surveillance and control deployed to head off trouble wherever it might arise. Shutting down untrammeled free speech by controlling the media, the Internet, and foreign NGOs fits into the strategy, along with mysterious assassinations that rub out vocal dissidents and whistleblowers.
Even more troublingly, the Axis has had great success in exporting its formula actively and by example. More and more countries now seem to prefer the Axis model of curbing opposition by invoking national exigencies, even when individual countries profess a closer allegiance to the West. Large swaths of the globe now desire stability above all, and they are thus more receptive to Axis propaganda, which promises exactly that. Across Eastern Europe, from Hungary through Belarus to Ukraine and Georgia, from Turkey to Egypt across the Middle East and Central Asia, the Putinist example has become the norm: jailing journalists and opponents, suborning the judiciary, censoring websites, and controlling media ownership while amassing executive power. The great wave of democratic movements championed by the U.S. during the post-Soviet era has hit a wall. Many states now operate from a fear of internal weakness. The West has failed to anticipate the wave of conservatism overtaking the globe; the Axis is deeply tuned in to it.
In contrast to the sometimes vague aspirational principles that America espouses, China and Russia focus on promoting things people need—food and jobs—or, failing that, things that people feel passionately about, such as national identity, religion, or culture. China achieves this by implicitly bribing its populace: In exchange for political docility, it enriches its citizens. The message is clear to potential allies such as Sudan or Zimbabwe: China can use the same methods to helpkeep other regimes in power. Russia offers a different method: appeals to culture, religion, morality, Russian pride, and anti-Americanism.
A closer look at both models makes clear how compelling they are for troubled populations, especially when compared with the muddled, amorphous American message. Two case studies—one Russian, one Chinese—illustrate the tenacity of the Axis nations in putting their models into practice. They succeed not only through their ruthlessness but also through the clarity of their vision. This was never more apparent than in the Georgian elections of 2012.
What Happened in Georgia, and Why It Matters
On October 1, 2012, the pro-American, former Soviet Republic of Georgia held a national parliamentary election. The winning party would nominate its leader as prime minister. The prime minister would work closely with President Mikheil Saakashvili, perhaps the most vocal anti-Kremlin head of state still in power around Russia’s periphery. Georgia was invaded by Russian tanks in 2008. Large chunks of Georgian territory had been occupied, including regions held by separatists, which
Add up these elements and you get strong clues to why Western social and political principles pose an active threat to the Axis nations. You also get a definitive explanation for the kind of messages the Axis feeds to its citizens at home and allies abroad: a tacit ideology heavy with pressure to conform. Axis propaganda derives directly from the systemic weaknesses in Russia and China, and from the need to hide them while offering compensatory illusions.
One such illusion is nostalgia for national greatness—in a word, nationalism, which Axis elites use more and more frequently to rally their domestic populations. The purpose and the effect of this dangerous tool we all know from historical precedents.
The notion of national greatness is part of a broader illusion involving a theme of conservatism at home and abroad—a pivotal development that the West has yet to notice or address. Meanwhile, the true activating principle of the state is continuity in power, with all the methods of modern surveillance and control deployed to head off trouble wherever it might arise. Shutting down untrammeled free speech by controlling the media, the Internet, and foreign NGOs fits into the strategy, along with mysterious assassinations that rub out vocal dissidents and whistleblowers.
Even more troublingly, the Axis has had great success in exporting its formula actively and by example. More and more countries now seem to prefer the Axis model of curbing opposition by invoking national exigencies, even when individual countries profess a closer allegiance to the West. Large swaths of the globe now desire stability above all, and they are thus more receptive to Axis propaganda, which promises exactly that. Across Eastern Europe, from Hungary through Belarus to Ukraine and Georgia, from Turkey to Egypt across the Middle East and Central Asia, the Putinist example has become the norm: jailing journalists and opponents, suborning the judiciary, censoring websites, and controlling media ownership while amassing executive power. The great wave of democratic movements championed by the U.S. during the post-Soviet era has hit a wall. Many states now operate from a fear of internal weakness. The West has failed to anticipate the wave of conservatism overtaking the globe; the Axis is deeply tuned in to it.
In contrast to the sometimes vague aspirational principles that America espouses, China and Russia focus on promoting things people need—food and jobs—or, failing that, things that people feel passionately about, such as national identity, religion, or culture. China achieves this by implicitly bribing its populace: In exchange for political docility, it enriches its citizens. The message is clear to potential allies such as Sudan or Zimbabwe: China can use the same methods to helpkeep other regimes in power. Russia offers a different method: appeals to culture, religion, morality, Russian pride, and anti-Americanism.
A closer look at both models makes clear how compelling they are for troubled populations, especially when compared with the muddled, amorphous American message. Two case studies—one Russian, one Chinese—illustrate the tenacity of the Axis nations in putting their models into practice. They succeed not only through their ruthlessness but also through the clarity of their vision. This was never more apparent than in the Georgian elections of 2012.
What Happened in Georgia, and Why It Matters
On October 1, 2012, the pro-American, former Soviet Republic of Georgia held a national parliamentary election. The winning party would nominate its leader as prime minister. The prime minister would work closely with President Mikheil Saakashvili, perhaps the most vocal anti-Kremlin head of state still in power around Russia’s periphery. Georgia was invaded by Russian tanks in 2008. Large chunks of Georgian territory had been occupied, including regions held by separatists, which
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