Terrible Swift Sword by Bruce Catton Page B

that natural sympathy with the seceding states which neither their
contempt for her interests nor their disloyalty to the Union has sufficed to
extinguish." On May 20 the governor made formal announcement of the
state's neutrality, warning "all other states, separate or united,
especially the United and Confederate states," not to enter Kentucky or to
occupy Kentucky soil without express invitation from the state's legislative
and executive authorities. 6
    In the long run this policy was bound to
fail, and throughout the summer both sides prepared methodically for the day of
failure. They began simply by seeking Kentucky recruits, carefully
establishing camps outside of the state for their reception —Union camp near
Cincinnati, just north of the Ohio River; Confederate camp near Clarksville,
Tennessee, just below the Kentucky-Tennessee line. Inside the state there was
the Kentucky State Guard, some 4000 militiamen strongly pro-Confederate in
sympathies, commanded by Brigadier General Simon Bolivar Buckner—a solid West
Pointer who had many friends in the Old Army, including both George B.
McClellan and Ulysses S. Grant, and who was correctly believed to be ready to
enter the Confederate service whenever neutrality should come to an end. As a
counterweight, Unionists formed a militia of their own, naming it the Home
Guard, and centering it at Camp Dick Robinson, not far from the state capital,
Frankfort. The Home Guard was led by a burly ex-lieutenant in the Navy, William
Nelson, a three-hundred-pound giant whom Mr. Lincoln made a brigadier general
of volunteers and entrusted with a substantial quantity of arms and ammunition. 7 Nelson had influence in Kentucky. He also had much drive, and a flaming
temper which one day would be the death of him; and now he worked hard to
prepare the loyalists for the coming fight.
    Governor Magoffin wrote letters of
protest—to Mr. Lincoln, complaining about Nelson's force at Camp Dick Robinson,
and to Mr. Davis, protesting the presence of Confederate troops in Tennessee,
close to the Kentucky line. Lincoln replied blandly that the men at Nelson's
camp were all Kentuckians, menacing nothing and attacking nothing; he did not
think most Kentuckians wanted them removed, and he would not remove them. Davis
replied with equal blandness, saying that his troops in Tennessee were there
solely to protect that state from invasion. 8 Things went on as they
had been, with Washington and Richmond raising troops, bringing in arms and
lining up leading Kentuckians, no overt acts being performed but nothing being
done in complete secrecy. During the summer Kentucky held a state election,
sending a solid Unionist slate to the Federal Congress and increasing the
Unionist majority in both houses of the state legislature.
    The stakes were high. In Confederate
hands, Kentucky would effectively blockade the Ohio River and deprive the Federals
of any feasible base for a large-scale offensive in the Mississippi Valley,
fundamental in the Union's grand strategy; if Mr. Lincoln felt that to lose
Kentucky was to lose everything there was good reason for it. Conversely, if
the state were held by the Union the Confederacy had no good way to save
Tennessee, hold the Mississippi, and stave off a drive into the deepest South.
Neither side could afford to lose, and neither side dared risk losing by moving
prematurely; Kentuckians were notably touchy, and as far as anyone could see in
the summer of 1861 they might go either way. Much would depend on which side
first angered the Kentucky majority.
    It was into this situation that General
Fremont had thrust his proclamation about freeing the slaves of people who supported
the Confederacy. The effect could have been a major Union disaster, except for
two things—Mr. Lincoln's disavowal of the proclamation, and the abrupt
appearance on Kentucky soil of a full-fledged Confederate Army, which on
September 3 crossed
the Tennessee line, occupied the towns of Hickman and Columbus,