“parallel unilateral statements,” statements that Abbas and Sharon would utter at Aqaba and that would reflect views compatible with the American approach. My computer contained dozens of drafts of these statements, and if the parties were amazed at the American chutzpah in proposing to put our words in their mouths, they did not say so. Perhaps it was Rice's warm but extremely firm approach; perhaps it was what appeared to be the smashing American victory in Iraq. But our parallel unilateral statements were never rejected; they were the basis for negotiations, word by word, line by line, because we wanted to be sure that Abbas made firm commitments against terror and Sharon equally firm ones about peace and Palestinian statehood. In these preparations, Rice entirely sidelined Colin Powell. As she notes in her memoir, “I took direct responsibility for overseeing U.S. efforts.” 16 Powell attended the Sharm and Aqaba summits but was a marginal figure. The calls and the meetings, the cajoling and pressuring, and the planning of what the president would say, to whom, and when were all White House activities. At best, State was informed and asked to perform various helpful supportive roles. Increasingly, Rice rather than Powell was acting for the president and was in charge of Middle East policy. Assistant Secretary Bill Burns was involved in the practical arrangements for what were now being called the “Red Sea Summits,” but neither he nor his boss was making policy; Burns was simply helping make sure the details were ironed out.
The president knew what he wanted: Terrorism must stop, which was not negotiable, and Abbas must say so in Aqaba. He could not stop 100% of the attacks, the president said, but the key is for Abu Mazen (the president never referred to him as Abbas) to show the world he is giving every ounce of effort to fighting terror. This was not an abstract argument: As we were planning for the Sharm and Aqaba meetings, Palestinian terror continued. OnMay 18, 7 people were killed and 20 wounded in another suicide bombing of a public bus, this time near French Hill in Jerusalem. The following day, a suicide bomber attacked in a shopping mall in northern Israel, killing 3 and injuring 70 more. These followed six smaller attacks in April and three earlier in May. Nor did Prime Minister Abbas believe he could stop them: When Sharon (in a May 17 meeting between the two men) offered him a redeployment of IDF troops so that Palestinian forces could take greater responsibility for security, he demurred. Instead, Abbas spoke of how weak his own position was; Sharon's notes of the meeting say, “They are not yet ready to take responsibility.” 17
On May 20, the president called the newly installed Palestinian prime minister, noting that it was his first call to a Palestinian leader in two years. Bush was warm and encouraging but clear about terror: Denounce terror and you have a friend in me, he said. If you want peace we can work together, and this is just the first of our calls and meetings. Bush told Abbas that Israel would never compromise its security and he would never ask them to do so, but the killers were the enemies of the Palestinians as well as Israelis. Abbas had the right responses: He was committed to peace and against terrorism, and he understood that without Israeli security there would be no peace. It was a good start.
Bush also called Sharon that day. A planned Sharon visit to Washington had been put off due to the terrorist attacks. Bush offered condolences for the deaths and injuries and said he understood why Sharon was staying home. He told Sharon he had spoken to Abu Mazen and thought the new prime minister wanted to move forward to peace. The United States would never jeopardize Israeli security, but we should help Abu Mazen; there is a chance for progress. Not if the terror continues, Sharon replied, and Abu Mazen, whatever his intentions, was doing nothing to stop it. Well, he just
The president knew what he wanted: Terrorism must stop, which was not negotiable, and Abbas must say so in Aqaba. He could not stop 100% of the attacks, the president said, but the key is for Abu Mazen (the president never referred to him as Abbas) to show the world he is giving every ounce of effort to fighting terror. This was not an abstract argument: As we were planning for the Sharm and Aqaba meetings, Palestinian terror continued. OnMay 18, 7 people were killed and 20 wounded in another suicide bombing of a public bus, this time near French Hill in Jerusalem. The following day, a suicide bomber attacked in a shopping mall in northern Israel, killing 3 and injuring 70 more. These followed six smaller attacks in April and three earlier in May. Nor did Prime Minister Abbas believe he could stop them: When Sharon (in a May 17 meeting between the two men) offered him a redeployment of IDF troops so that Palestinian forces could take greater responsibility for security, he demurred. Instead, Abbas spoke of how weak his own position was; Sharon's notes of the meeting say, “They are not yet ready to take responsibility.” 17
On May 20, the president called the newly installed Palestinian prime minister, noting that it was his first call to a Palestinian leader in two years. Bush was warm and encouraging but clear about terror: Denounce terror and you have a friend in me, he said. If you want peace we can work together, and this is just the first of our calls and meetings. Bush told Abbas that Israel would never compromise its security and he would never ask them to do so, but the killers were the enemies of the Palestinians as well as Israelis. Abbas had the right responses: He was committed to peace and against terrorism, and he understood that without Israeli security there would be no peace. It was a good start.
Bush also called Sharon that day. A planned Sharon visit to Washington had been put off due to the terrorist attacks. Bush offered condolences for the deaths and injuries and said he understood why Sharon was staying home. He told Sharon he had spoken to Abu Mazen and thought the new prime minister wanted to move forward to peace. The United States would never jeopardize Israeli security, but we should help Abu Mazen; there is a chance for progress. Not if the terror continues, Sharon replied, and Abu Mazen, whatever his intentions, was doing nothing to stop it. Well, he just
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