Tested by Zion by Elliott Abrams

concluded, who said this is Terra Sancta to all, but Terra Promisa for the Jews only.
    The discussion of the route of the security fence Sharon was building was typical of these sessions. The United States had not been supportive of the move initially, but repeated suicide bombings had chipped away at American resistance – and over time the success of the barrier in stopping such attacks became an unanswerable argument. This day Sharon explained the proposed route at length and with maps. Having commanded troops in every part ofIsrael, he knew the terrain almost by the square meter; he could explain why the route in one place or another could not be changed because “here there is a hill and you have to go around it; here there is a spring.” Hadley told him of the widespread criticism that the fence and its route were an effort to create facts on the ground and prejudice final status negotiations. This is not a border, Sharon answered; it is just another means to control terror. You want us to withdraw from the West Bank towns; this allows us to do so without allowing more terror. And as to the critics who say this is just an Israeli land grab, Sharon replied that we don't want land; we want to protect people. Look, he said, you can't defend a nation based on what the New York Times will write.
A “Settlement Freeze”
    By the end of this visit in early May, the American victory in Iraq was being celebrated; President Bush's “Mission Accomplished” landing on an aircraft carrier came on May 2. After the talks with Sharon, I thought I understood his intentions very well. Our discussion of settlements had revealed that he did not plan any new settlements, nor did he envision the physical expansion of the settlements that existed. There would be no need to include more land within settlement borders. Moreover, financial enticements to Israelis to move to the settlements were also on their way out, for budgetary reasons if for nothing else. We were stuck with the phrase “settlement freeze,” which had appeared in the Mitchell Reportin 2001 and in the Roadmap andbeen repeated endlessly by Powell andother State Department officials as well as by the president. After the conversations with Sharon, I told Rice andHadley we could say we had an acceptable “settlement freeze” if Sharon did the following: announced a commitment to a viable Palestinian state, agreed that the security fence was for security only and was not meant to be a border, ended all subsidies to Israelis to move across the Green Line into settlements in the West Bank or Gaza, and said that said there would be no new settlements or taking of land for new settlements or physical expansion of existing ones, and that new construction in settlements would reflect only natural growth and be only in built-up areas. The last condition was simple: It did not prejudice Palestinians or block final status talks if Israelis built new houses or apartments inside existing settlements, using no additional land. Ma'ale Adumim had (at that time) perhaps 35,000 people, so adding another couple of thousand inside the settlement borders was not a major event. Building on new territory or at the edge of settlements, which would require security roads and perimeters to use additional land, was different – and to be avoided.
    This was a formula that could work and represented a decent compromise between the United States and Israel without prejudicing Palestinian interests. Of course, the PA demanded an absolute halt to construction of any kind in the settlements andin Jerusalem, but no Israeli government would ever agreeto that and the Palestinians knew it. The discussions we were holding with Israeli officials were moving toward a sensible compromise on the settlement issue.
    Sharon's goals appeared to me to be to build the fence, stop the terrorism, and get to Phase II of the Roadmap. That would mean negotiations over the existence of a Palestinian state and of its