The Dandarnelles Disaster by Dan Van der Vat Page B

alarm, that the Germans would try to interfere with French troop movements, the admiral at seven p.m. on the 2nd ordered all troopships to stay in port until naval escorts arrived. As the entire fleet was also still in port, this implied a two-day delay for XIX Corps. Despite the chaos at the Paris Ministry of Marine, following the resignation of the minister after a nervous collapse, the Cabinet cobbled together a message to Lapeyrère, telling him the German ships had been seen at Brindisi on the night of 31 July–1August. He was told unequivocally to ‘set sail … and stop them’. Once again he was ordered to let troopships sail at once, alone if necessary. Once again he stayed in port. Early on the morning of 3 August he was told that the Germans had arrived at Messina on the afternoon of the 2nd. Lapeyrère finally set sail at four a.m.
    The fleet was divided into three sections. Vice-Admiral Chocheprat led Group A, consisting of the First Squadron (six of the latest pre-dreadnoughts) and the First Light Division (four heavy cruisers and a dozen destroyers). This amounted to half the fleet and was bound for Philippeville. Lapeyrère himself led Group B in the dreadnought Courbet , accompanied by the Second Squadron of five older battleships (Rear-Admiral Le Bris), the Second Light Division and various auxiliaries, all bound for Algiers. The slow Group C, including the elderly Reserve Division of battleships with one extra added and four destroyers, had been sent out of Toulon on the evening of the 2nd and had reached the Balearic Islands, whence it was sent to Oran. All three groups were sailing at an almost leisurely 11–12 knots, Group A to the east, Group B in the centre and C to the west, corresponding to their destinations. All were in close order; amazingly, there was no screen of cruisers or destroyers to scout, despite the known imminence of general war.
    On the afternoon of 3 August the French commander-in-chief received an offer of support from Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne, commanding the British Mediterranean Fleet (who embarrassingly outranked the Frenchman under whom he was expected to serve in wartime). He reminded the French that he had 3 battlecruisers, 4 heavy cruisers and 4 light, plus 16 destroyers. Taking his time, that night Lapeyrère thanked Milne, told him he was covering the passage of the Army of Africa and airily asked him to watch the movements of the Italian, Austrian and German fleets. ‘You will be informed as soon as I have regained my freedom of movement.’ By midnight he knew that Italy had declared herself neutral and that the Germans had left Messina a second time and were being hunted by the British. Just after one a.m. on 4 August he received the text of a message from Paris which had taken an inexcusable five hours to decode and clarify, once again ordering him not to waste time with convoys, to work with the British to provide general cover for the troopships and to ‘destroy German cruisers, hostilities with Germany being now declared’. Germany had formally declared war with effect from six p.m. CET on 3 August. Lapeyrère had been ordered three times in 80 hours not to form convoys and twice in under 30 to catch the German ships.
    The Breslau fired 190 15-cm shells at her target in 19 minutes; the Goeben , delayed for an hour by the need to avoid being sighted by two unidentified steamers, opened fire for ten minutes just after five a.m. with her secondary, 15-cm guns; 36 rounds caused a spectacular conflagration ashore. News of the shelling of Bône reached Lapeyrère by five a.m. on 4 August; and that of Philippeville, 60 miles to the west, 80 minutes later. The Germans were reported to be heading west after their bombardments – a feint, as subsequent reports revealed: Souchon was eastward-bound, heading back to Messina, desperately hoping he could find some more coal, especially for the Goeben, her bunkers now less than