resolved that, with or without a national consensus, the war against terrorism must go on. Terrorism is seen as arising out of the dysfunctional culture of the Middle East, a culture that the Islamic radicals exploit. Therefore the ultimate answer is for the West to take up what Daniel Pipes terms the “burden of bringing Islam into harmony with modernity.” The Bush administration has adopted the view that America should work to advance the two institutions that the Islamic radicals fear most, namely liberalism and democracy. In his Second Inaugural Address, delivered on January 20, 2005, Bush declared the promotion of liberal democracy the centerpiece of American foreign policy. Every nation, Bush said, must have either “oppression, which is always wrong,” or “freedom, which is eternally right.” Bush also insisted that “the best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in the entire world.” Therefore, he concluded, “America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.” 13
Bush is convinced that it is especially important for America to promote freedom and democracy in the Muslim world. In some cases, this was to be accomplished through the use of force. In others, Bush and his allies intend to use diplomacy, economic sanctions, and other forms of pressure or persuasion. Some conservatives even seek to compel American allies like Saudi Arabia to move away from Wahhabi extremism toward liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is the best remedy for terrorism, in this view, because when Muslims discover the benefits of self-government and freedom they will not be attracted to extremist groups that promote suicide bombings and violence. When that happens, Bush said in 2005, “The flow of violent radicalism to the rest of the world will slow, and eventually end.” 14 As prosecuted by the Bush administration, America’s long-term strategy is to undermine support for extremists by converting Muslims into liberals, and autocratic states into democratic states. The conservative hope is that if this strategy shows signs of working, the vast majority of Americans will unite behind the project to promote liberal democracy abroad.
THERE ARE ELEMENTS of truth in the conservative account, but it contains serious flaws that have inhibited understanding and helped produce a confused policy that has failed to win broad public support. Here I examine three of these flaws, although others will emerge in the course of this book. If the war against terrorism is lost, it will be because the Bush administration and its conservative allies never really understood what they were up against, and therefore never carried out the strategy necessary to defeat the adversary.
First,
terrorism is not the enemy.
In the previous chapter I noted that terrorism is not an adversary; terrorism is a tactic that is sometimes used by the adversary. Even Al Qaeda should not be understood exclusively as a terror group or franchise. Primarily it is a combat training enterprise whose training camps in Afghanistan, the Sudan, Yemen, and elsewhere were used to develop paramilitary fighters. Several of Al Qaeda’s attacks, such as the bombing of the U.S.S.
Cole,
were clearly aimed at military targets and can hardly be called “terrorism” in any meaningful sense. Even on 9/11, bin Laden’s goal was not to kill civilians per se but to strike out at the symbols of America’s economy (World Trade Center), America’s government (the White House or the Capitol), and America’s military (the Pentagon). Although 9/11 is routinely described as a terrorist attack, can anyone seriously maintain that the Pentagon was not a military target? Yes, there were civilians on the planes but the purpose of hijacking planes was not to kill the civilians on board but to use the winged juggernauts as flaming projectiles to destroy the intended symbolic targets. Whether those who happened to be in the World Trade Center and
Bush is convinced that it is especially important for America to promote freedom and democracy in the Muslim world. In some cases, this was to be accomplished through the use of force. In others, Bush and his allies intend to use diplomacy, economic sanctions, and other forms of pressure or persuasion. Some conservatives even seek to compel American allies like Saudi Arabia to move away from Wahhabi extremism toward liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is the best remedy for terrorism, in this view, because when Muslims discover the benefits of self-government and freedom they will not be attracted to extremist groups that promote suicide bombings and violence. When that happens, Bush said in 2005, “The flow of violent radicalism to the rest of the world will slow, and eventually end.” 14 As prosecuted by the Bush administration, America’s long-term strategy is to undermine support for extremists by converting Muslims into liberals, and autocratic states into democratic states. The conservative hope is that if this strategy shows signs of working, the vast majority of Americans will unite behind the project to promote liberal democracy abroad.
THERE ARE ELEMENTS of truth in the conservative account, but it contains serious flaws that have inhibited understanding and helped produce a confused policy that has failed to win broad public support. Here I examine three of these flaws, although others will emerge in the course of this book. If the war against terrorism is lost, it will be because the Bush administration and its conservative allies never really understood what they were up against, and therefore never carried out the strategy necessary to defeat the adversary.
First,
terrorism is not the enemy.
In the previous chapter I noted that terrorism is not an adversary; terrorism is a tactic that is sometimes used by the adversary. Even Al Qaeda should not be understood exclusively as a terror group or franchise. Primarily it is a combat training enterprise whose training camps in Afghanistan, the Sudan, Yemen, and elsewhere were used to develop paramilitary fighters. Several of Al Qaeda’s attacks, such as the bombing of the U.S.S.
Cole,
were clearly aimed at military targets and can hardly be called “terrorism” in any meaningful sense. Even on 9/11, bin Laden’s goal was not to kill civilians per se but to strike out at the symbols of America’s economy (World Trade Center), America’s government (the White House or the Capitol), and America’s military (the Pentagon). Although 9/11 is routinely described as a terrorist attack, can anyone seriously maintain that the Pentagon was not a military target? Yes, there were civilians on the planes but the purpose of hijacking planes was not to kill the civilians on board but to use the winged juggernauts as flaming projectiles to destroy the intended symbolic targets. Whether those who happened to be in the World Trade Center and
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