of 1592 was a formidable force, the Darwinian end product of more than a century of civil war that saw traditional military thought give way to more practical methods of killing. The way of the samurai was still considered glorious, quality horseflesh was still appreciated, and the finely crafted katana sword was still a highly valued thing. But they were no longer the mainstay in Japanese warfare. The lightweight arquebus had changed all that. It was relatively cheap to manufacture. It shot farther than a bow, and more important, packed a greater armor-piercing punch at the closer distances preferred in battle, usually one hundred meters or less. It was easy to use; an uneducated farmer could be taught to handle one effectively in just a few weeks. It did not demand the same degree of intestinal fortitude to wield in battle as did “short weapons” such as the sword and spear; Japanese arquebusiers commonly did their work from behind protective cover. And it gave a soldier an overwhelming, even shocking, advantage. As Oda Nobunaga’s stunning victory in the Battle of Nagashino demonstrated, no amount of samurai skill or courage could prevail against a curtain of flying lead balls. In that seminal 1575 engagement, three thousand Oda foot soldiers stood behind a wooden paling with muskets in hand and patiently mowed down charge after charge of traditionally armed adversaries. After that Japanese warfare was never the same.
Samurai therefore did not constitute a very large portion of Hideyoshi’s invasion army in 1592, nor were traditional cavalry units much in evidence. The use of horses was largely confined to daimyo commanders and their officers, custodians of the samurai tradition with their superbly crafted armor, fierce war masks, and exquisite swords. The bulk of the army was now the ashigaru, the foot soldier. These were mainly farmers and fishermen recruited and trained by daimyo from their respective domains, men like Hideyoshi’s own father Yaemon. They would have been a rough lot, poorly educated and for the most part unable to read. They would not have traveled much; the march to Nagoya alone was likely the greatest journey many had ever taken. In looking ahead to the crossing to Korea, fear was probably the dominant emotion—fear of dying in a strange and distant place. Most probably wanted nothing more than to get the job done and return to their families. But on the other hand all the talk circulating through the camps of Korean and Chinese wealth must have been alluring, conjuring up visions of cities overflowing with booty, just sitting there for conquering Japanese soldiers to haul away home.
The ashigaru were equipped with swords and spears and bows in addition to lightweight muskets. A portion of these traditional weapons came from the various sword hunts Hideyoshi had conducted over the previous few years to disarm the peasantry of Japan. His edict of 1589 had declared that all weapons turned in would be used in the construction of the Great Buddha in Kyoto, but the stipulation that swords be collected together with their scabbards indicates that they were to be stored for future use, not melted down to make nails and bolts. One source states that a total of 5,000 battle axes, 100,000 long swords, 100,000 short swords, 100,000 spears, and 500,000 daggers were collected through sword hunts and daimyo requisitions and transported to Nagoya. This figure is undoubtedly inflated, but it is safe to say that Hideyoshi’s army was generously supplied with traditional weapons.
Such was not the case with muskets. Subsequent letters sent home from Korea by Japanese commanders would repeatedly state that they had more than enough swords and spears and arrows and did not want any more. What they needed were more muskets. To the Koreans the invading Japanese seemed well equipped with these feared weapons; one source opined they had 300,000 of them. [119] This is a very unlikely figure. The exact number is not
Samurai therefore did not constitute a very large portion of Hideyoshi’s invasion army in 1592, nor were traditional cavalry units much in evidence. The use of horses was largely confined to daimyo commanders and their officers, custodians of the samurai tradition with their superbly crafted armor, fierce war masks, and exquisite swords. The bulk of the army was now the ashigaru, the foot soldier. These were mainly farmers and fishermen recruited and trained by daimyo from their respective domains, men like Hideyoshi’s own father Yaemon. They would have been a rough lot, poorly educated and for the most part unable to read. They would not have traveled much; the march to Nagoya alone was likely the greatest journey many had ever taken. In looking ahead to the crossing to Korea, fear was probably the dominant emotion—fear of dying in a strange and distant place. Most probably wanted nothing more than to get the job done and return to their families. But on the other hand all the talk circulating through the camps of Korean and Chinese wealth must have been alluring, conjuring up visions of cities overflowing with booty, just sitting there for conquering Japanese soldiers to haul away home.
The ashigaru were equipped with swords and spears and bows in addition to lightweight muskets. A portion of these traditional weapons came from the various sword hunts Hideyoshi had conducted over the previous few years to disarm the peasantry of Japan. His edict of 1589 had declared that all weapons turned in would be used in the construction of the Great Buddha in Kyoto, but the stipulation that swords be collected together with their scabbards indicates that they were to be stored for future use, not melted down to make nails and bolts. One source states that a total of 5,000 battle axes, 100,000 long swords, 100,000 short swords, 100,000 spears, and 500,000 daggers were collected through sword hunts and daimyo requisitions and transported to Nagoya. This figure is undoubtedly inflated, but it is safe to say that Hideyoshi’s army was generously supplied with traditional weapons.
Such was not the case with muskets. Subsequent letters sent home from Korea by Japanese commanders would repeatedly state that they had more than enough swords and spears and arrows and did not want any more. What they needed were more muskets. To the Koreans the invading Japanese seemed well equipped with these feared weapons; one source opined they had 300,000 of them. [119] This is a very unlikely figure. The exact number is not
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