mobilized nationwide in the spring of 1592 for the invasion of Korea. Of this number 235,000 were sent to invasion headquarters at Nagoya, and 100,000 were shifted about the country to strengthen areas left under-defended by the massive mobilizations. Of the 235,000 encamped in and around Nagoya Castle, 158,800 were earmarked to actually cross over to Korea. It was logistically impossible for Hideyoshi to send this entire force to Korea in one huge mass. Had he done so they would have starved. Instead he grouped the various daimyo-led units into nine separate contingents varying in size from 10,000 up to 30,000 men, the natural limit in the late sixteenth century to the size of a body of troops that could be kept fed and functioning in the field. [116] The daimyo commander of each of these units was provided with a map of the Korean Peninsula depicting its eight provinces and the three routes north. These maps were copies of one that So Yoshitoshi had acquired during his mission to Korea and presented to Hideyoshi. The taiko had taken it and painted each of Korea’s eight provinces a different color to distinguish them. Henceforth each province would be identified among the Japanese by its corresponding hue on this map of operations: Cholla-do was the “Red Country,” Chungchong-do the “Blue Country,” Kyongsang-do the “Green Country,” and so on. [117]
At first glance this invasion army seems to have been composed of the variety of Japanese troops that one would expect Hideyoshi’s system of sliding levies to have yielded: 82,200 men, fifty-two percent of the total force, were from Kyushu; 57,000 (thity-six percent) were from Honshu; and 19,600 (twelve percent) were from Shikoku. It was a distribu tion that made sense: Kyushu bordered Korea, so Kyushu should contribute most; Honshu and Shikoku were farther away, so their contributions should be proportionally less. It would be wrong to infer, however, that Hideyoshi intended Kyushu troops to do fifty-two percent of the fighting, Honshu troops thirty-six percent, and Shikoku troops twelve percent. In examining the order of battle he drew up on April 24, 1592, a pattern emerges that reveals something of his domino strategy for the conquest of Asia.
Konishi Yukinaga’s first contingent, Kato Kiyomasa’s second, and Kuroda Nagamasa’s third were charged with spearheading the invasion of Korea. This force consisted entirely of men from Kyushu and its offshore islands. They would sail first from Nagoya to Tsushima, reassemble on that island, then push on to Pusan. Once on Korean soil their mission was to drive north to Seoul as fast as they could. Contingents four through seven would then follow to reinforce the advance armies for the continued push to the Chinese border. These four contingents were also composed mainly of units from western Japan: the fourth and sixth were made up entirely of Kyushu men, the fifth came from the island of Shikoku, and the seventh from western Honshu. Contingents eight and nine, consisting of men from western and central Honshu, would in the meantime remain in reserve on their respective island bases at Tsushima and Iki, crossing to Korea as conditions warranted. A further force of 75,000 provided by Tokugawa Ieyasu, Date Masamune, Uesugi Kagekatsu, and other Honshu daimyo, would remain stationed at invasion headquarters at Nagoya. Hideyoshi did not plan to send this reserve into action; their job was to protect Nagoya in the event of a Chinese counterattack. Finally, a force of some 100,000 men was moved down from the Tokai and Kinai regions of eastern Honshu to protect the capital of Kyoto, which the Nagoya mobilizations had left inadequately defended.
Kyushu men, therefore, while comprising slightly more than half of Hideyoshi’s invasion force, would do most of the actual fighting; Honshu divisions would back them up or remain at Nagoya as a “home guard.” This troop utilization represented a new approach to conquest for
At first glance this invasion army seems to have been composed of the variety of Japanese troops that one would expect Hideyoshi’s system of sliding levies to have yielded: 82,200 men, fifty-two percent of the total force, were from Kyushu; 57,000 (thity-six percent) were from Honshu; and 19,600 (twelve percent) were from Shikoku. It was a distribu tion that made sense: Kyushu bordered Korea, so Kyushu should contribute most; Honshu and Shikoku were farther away, so their contributions should be proportionally less. It would be wrong to infer, however, that Hideyoshi intended Kyushu troops to do fifty-two percent of the fighting, Honshu troops thirty-six percent, and Shikoku troops twelve percent. In examining the order of battle he drew up on April 24, 1592, a pattern emerges that reveals something of his domino strategy for the conquest of Asia.
Konishi Yukinaga’s first contingent, Kato Kiyomasa’s second, and Kuroda Nagamasa’s third were charged with spearheading the invasion of Korea. This force consisted entirely of men from Kyushu and its offshore islands. They would sail first from Nagoya to Tsushima, reassemble on that island, then push on to Pusan. Once on Korean soil their mission was to drive north to Seoul as fast as they could. Contingents four through seven would then follow to reinforce the advance armies for the continued push to the Chinese border. These four contingents were also composed mainly of units from western Japan: the fourth and sixth were made up entirely of Kyushu men, the fifth came from the island of Shikoku, and the seventh from western Honshu. Contingents eight and nine, consisting of men from western and central Honshu, would in the meantime remain in reserve on their respective island bases at Tsushima and Iki, crossing to Korea as conditions warranted. A further force of 75,000 provided by Tokugawa Ieyasu, Date Masamune, Uesugi Kagekatsu, and other Honshu daimyo, would remain stationed at invasion headquarters at Nagoya. Hideyoshi did not plan to send this reserve into action; their job was to protect Nagoya in the event of a Chinese counterattack. Finally, a force of some 100,000 men was moved down from the Tokai and Kinai regions of eastern Honshu to protect the capital of Kyoto, which the Nagoya mobilizations had left inadequately defended.
Kyushu men, therefore, while comprising slightly more than half of Hideyoshi’s invasion force, would do most of the actual fighting; Honshu divisions would back them up or remain at Nagoya as a “home guard.” This troop utilization represented a new approach to conquest for
Similar Books
