Iâll concentrate on monarchies, taking the situations mentioned above and discussing how each kind of state can best be governed and held.
So Iâll begin by noting that hereditary monarchies where people have long been used to the rulerâs family are far easier to hold than new ones; all a monarch need do is avoid upsetting the order established by his predecessors, trim policies to circumstances when there is trouble, and, assuming he is of average ability, he will keep his kingdom for life. Only extraordinary and overwhelming force will be able to take it off him and even then heâll win it back as soon as the occupying power runs into trouble.
An example of this situation in Italy is the Duchy of Ferrara. In 1484 and 1510 the Duchy was briefly conquered by foreign powers, first the Venetians, then Pope Julius, but these defeats had nothing to do with the territoryâs having a well-established ruling family. A ruler who inherits power has less reason or need to upset his subjects than a new one and as a result is better loved. If he doesnât go out of his way to get himself hated, itâs reasonable to suppose his people will wish him well. When a dynasty survives for generations memories fade and likewise motives for change; upheaval, on the contrary, always leaves the scaffolding for building further change.
3
Mixed monarchies
When a monarchy is new, things are harder. If itâs not entirely new but a territory added to an existing monarchy (letâs call this overall situation âmixedâ) instabilities are caused first and foremost by what is an inevitable problem for all new regimes: that men are quick to change ruler when they imagine they can improve their lot - it is this conviction that prompts them to take up arms and rebel - then later they discover they were wrong and that things have got worse rather than better. Again this is in the normal, natural way of things: a ruler is bound to upset the people in his new territories, first with his occupying army and then with all the endless injustices consequent on any invasion. So not only do you make enemies of those whose interests you damaged when you occupied the territory, but you canât even keep the friendship of the people who helped you to take power, this for the simple reason that you canât give them as much as they expected. And you canât get tough with them either, since you still need them; because however strong your armies, youâll always need local support to occupy a new territory. This is why Louis XII, King of France, took Milan so quickly and equally quickly lost it. The first time this happened Duke Ludovico was able to retake the city with his own forces, because the people who had previously opened the gates to Louis saw their mistake, realized they wouldnât be getting the benefits theyâd hoped for and didnât want to submit to the harsh conditions imposed by the new king.
Of course, when a king returns to win back a territory that has rebelled like this, he is less likely to lose it a second time. Having learned from the rebellion, heâll have fewer scruples when it comes to punishing troublemakers, interrogating suspects and strengthening any weak points in his defences. So while the first time Louis invaded Milan it took no more than a little sword-rattling along the borders from Ludovico to force a retreat, the second time it would take the whole world to defeat his armies and drive them out of Italy. This for the reasons listed above. All the same, they were driven out both times.
The general reasons behind the first French defeat have been discussed. It remains to explain why Louis lost Milan the second time and to see what counter-measures he could have taken and what options a ruler has in a situation like this if he wants to hold on to his conquest.
Needless to say, any territory annexed to the realm of a conquering ruler may or may not be in the same
So Iâll begin by noting that hereditary monarchies where people have long been used to the rulerâs family are far easier to hold than new ones; all a monarch need do is avoid upsetting the order established by his predecessors, trim policies to circumstances when there is trouble, and, assuming he is of average ability, he will keep his kingdom for life. Only extraordinary and overwhelming force will be able to take it off him and even then heâll win it back as soon as the occupying power runs into trouble.
An example of this situation in Italy is the Duchy of Ferrara. In 1484 and 1510 the Duchy was briefly conquered by foreign powers, first the Venetians, then Pope Julius, but these defeats had nothing to do with the territoryâs having a well-established ruling family. A ruler who inherits power has less reason or need to upset his subjects than a new one and as a result is better loved. If he doesnât go out of his way to get himself hated, itâs reasonable to suppose his people will wish him well. When a dynasty survives for generations memories fade and likewise motives for change; upheaval, on the contrary, always leaves the scaffolding for building further change.
3
Mixed monarchies
When a monarchy is new, things are harder. If itâs not entirely new but a territory added to an existing monarchy (letâs call this overall situation âmixedâ) instabilities are caused first and foremost by what is an inevitable problem for all new regimes: that men are quick to change ruler when they imagine they can improve their lot - it is this conviction that prompts them to take up arms and rebel - then later they discover they were wrong and that things have got worse rather than better. Again this is in the normal, natural way of things: a ruler is bound to upset the people in his new territories, first with his occupying army and then with all the endless injustices consequent on any invasion. So not only do you make enemies of those whose interests you damaged when you occupied the territory, but you canât even keep the friendship of the people who helped you to take power, this for the simple reason that you canât give them as much as they expected. And you canât get tough with them either, since you still need them; because however strong your armies, youâll always need local support to occupy a new territory. This is why Louis XII, King of France, took Milan so quickly and equally quickly lost it. The first time this happened Duke Ludovico was able to retake the city with his own forces, because the people who had previously opened the gates to Louis saw their mistake, realized they wouldnât be getting the benefits theyâd hoped for and didnât want to submit to the harsh conditions imposed by the new king.
Of course, when a king returns to win back a territory that has rebelled like this, he is less likely to lose it a second time. Having learned from the rebellion, heâll have fewer scruples when it comes to punishing troublemakers, interrogating suspects and strengthening any weak points in his defences. So while the first time Louis invaded Milan it took no more than a little sword-rattling along the borders from Ludovico to force a retreat, the second time it would take the whole world to defeat his armies and drive them out of Italy. This for the reasons listed above. All the same, they were driven out both times.
The general reasons behind the first French defeat have been discussed. It remains to explain why Louis lost Milan the second time and to see what counter-measures he could have taken and what options a ruler has in a situation like this if he wants to hold on to his conquest.
Needless to say, any territory annexed to the realm of a conquering ruler may or may not be in the same
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