fray in Europe, knew that to wait until 1943 to attack the enemy was politically risky.
A few days after arriving in London, Marshall sent a cable back to Roosevelt telling the president that the Joint Command was at an impasse. The British could not be convinced to participate in Sledgehammer, the plan to invade France directly across the channel, and the Americans remained skeptical about an invasion of North Africa.
It was Roosevelt who made the decision to accept the British plan of invading North Africa. Much to the delight of Winston Churchill and the British high command, he responded to Marshall’s cable with one of his own, announcing his decision. Operation Sledgehammer, the direct assault against France, was not to be—at least in 1942. The Allies would acquiesce to the British and attack North Africa.
Stephen Ambrose describes Eisenhower as “darkly depressed by the decision.” In fact, his feelings ran so strong that this usually temperate general, a man who had gone so far as to ban all pessimistic talkat his command headquarters in London, told his second in command, General Mark Clark, “July 22, 1942,”—the day the decision to invade North Africa had been agreed upon—“will go down asthe blackest day in history!”
Eisenhower was not the sort of soldier to stew a long time over a decision that belonged to the commander in chief, however. Plus, he was simply too busy and too burdened with the responsibilities of his command to continue to fight a political battle that he could not win. He immediately sat down with the British and began to outline an invasion of North Africa.
What was initially envisioned was a double-pronged assault on the French Vichy territories in North Africa. The French North African empire swept nearly eight hundred miles from Tunisia, on the Mediterranean just to the west of Libya, around the northwest corner of the continent and down the Atlantic coast, encompassing the nation of French Morocco. Spanish Morocco, a tiny wedge of land directly across from Gibraltar on the northern tip of Africa and encasing the city of Tangier, remained a protectorate of Spain.
The plan called for one arm of the assault to swing toward Algiers on the Mediterranean. This would be composed largely of British forces. The second punch of the invasion was to be a roundhouse directed at French Morocco on the Atlantic side of the continent.
To Marshall and Eisenhower, the western assault was crucial in preventing a possible German invasion of Gibraltar through Spain. By taking Morocco, the Allies would be able to maintain communication from the Mediterranean if Franco allowed Hitler to overrun Gibraltar.
It was this force, wholly American, that the man sleeping in the back of the Stratoliner had been tapped to lead. What they needed, Eisenhower and Marshall agreed, was a soldier who would take Morocco quickly and efficiently. They needed a fighting general like George Patton.
CHAPTER 3
Incorrigible
H oused in a seven-by-nine-foot cell and fed black bread and “a doubtful liquid with a few scraps of meat in a dirty wooden bowl,” René Malevergne passed his first couple of days in solitude at the Rabat prison, except for the periodic presence of guards opening and shutting his cell door to hand him these foul meals. On the third day, he was taken to the regional director of security and interrogated about his associations, at which time he learned that his coconspirators had been rounded up as well. He was told that if he gave the authorities the truth about the plans, he would soon see his wife and children. Malevergne was shown correspondence that had been found in the hands of the captain of the
São José
, but Malevergne knew that the letter had nothing incriminating in it and said so to his questioner.
But the ship’s captain was plotting to take Belgian pilots out of Morocco to England
, he was told.
So what?
said Malevergne.
It was my duty as port pilot to board any ship coming
A few days after arriving in London, Marshall sent a cable back to Roosevelt telling the president that the Joint Command was at an impasse. The British could not be convinced to participate in Sledgehammer, the plan to invade France directly across the channel, and the Americans remained skeptical about an invasion of North Africa.
It was Roosevelt who made the decision to accept the British plan of invading North Africa. Much to the delight of Winston Churchill and the British high command, he responded to Marshall’s cable with one of his own, announcing his decision. Operation Sledgehammer, the direct assault against France, was not to be—at least in 1942. The Allies would acquiesce to the British and attack North Africa.
Stephen Ambrose describes Eisenhower as “darkly depressed by the decision.” In fact, his feelings ran so strong that this usually temperate general, a man who had gone so far as to ban all pessimistic talkat his command headquarters in London, told his second in command, General Mark Clark, “July 22, 1942,”—the day the decision to invade North Africa had been agreed upon—“will go down asthe blackest day in history!”
Eisenhower was not the sort of soldier to stew a long time over a decision that belonged to the commander in chief, however. Plus, he was simply too busy and too burdened with the responsibilities of his command to continue to fight a political battle that he could not win. He immediately sat down with the British and began to outline an invasion of North Africa.
What was initially envisioned was a double-pronged assault on the French Vichy territories in North Africa. The French North African empire swept nearly eight hundred miles from Tunisia, on the Mediterranean just to the west of Libya, around the northwest corner of the continent and down the Atlantic coast, encompassing the nation of French Morocco. Spanish Morocco, a tiny wedge of land directly across from Gibraltar on the northern tip of Africa and encasing the city of Tangier, remained a protectorate of Spain.
The plan called for one arm of the assault to swing toward Algiers on the Mediterranean. This would be composed largely of British forces. The second punch of the invasion was to be a roundhouse directed at French Morocco on the Atlantic side of the continent.
To Marshall and Eisenhower, the western assault was crucial in preventing a possible German invasion of Gibraltar through Spain. By taking Morocco, the Allies would be able to maintain communication from the Mediterranean if Franco allowed Hitler to overrun Gibraltar.
It was this force, wholly American, that the man sleeping in the back of the Stratoliner had been tapped to lead. What they needed, Eisenhower and Marshall agreed, was a soldier who would take Morocco quickly and efficiently. They needed a fighting general like George Patton.
CHAPTER 3
Incorrigible
H oused in a seven-by-nine-foot cell and fed black bread and “a doubtful liquid with a few scraps of meat in a dirty wooden bowl,” René Malevergne passed his first couple of days in solitude at the Rabat prison, except for the periodic presence of guards opening and shutting his cell door to hand him these foul meals. On the third day, he was taken to the regional director of security and interrogated about his associations, at which time he learned that his coconspirators had been rounded up as well. He was told that if he gave the authorities the truth about the plans, he would soon see his wife and children. Malevergne was shown correspondence that had been found in the hands of the captain of the
São José
, but Malevergne knew that the letter had nothing incriminating in it and said so to his questioner.
But the ship’s captain was plotting to take Belgian pilots out of Morocco to England
, he was told.
So what?
said Malevergne.
It was my duty as port pilot to board any ship coming
Similar Books
