was the question of what would be the response of the neutral nations in the area: Spain and Vichy France. French North Africa had not been occupied by the Axis powers, as was France itself. But since German trust in the capabilities and loyalty of the Vichy government was limited, the question was, how long would the Nazis stay removed from the French protectorates in North Africa?
Spain’s role in the matter was likewise crucial. As Eisenhower would later put it, “there was a lively danger” that the Germans would attack through Axis-friendly Spain, threatening the strategically crucialBritish-held Gibraltar and the invasion itself. With Gibraltar in the hands of Germany the Allied forces would be sealed off within the Mediterranean, a devastating situation for the invaders.
Finally, there was the matter of what the French themselves would do. Would French colonists consider an invasion force in North Africa liberators or an enemy violating the neutrality of the region? Would the French in North Africa fight or not?
And once engaged in North Africa, the Allies would, by virtue of commitment of resources to the action, be fully engaged. Even if the French met them on the beaches of the Mediterranean and Atlantic waving banners and cheering, the Allied forces would still have to battle German Panzer divisions, which would soon be racing across the desert to halt them. The fear in American quarters was that an attack in North Africa would ultimately run from the Red Sea to the Atlantic and take the rest of 1942 and well into 1943 to carry out. It would inevitably force a delay in the assault against the strength of Germany’s European forces in France.
For American doubters of the strategy, the question was why American forces should waste manpower and treasure in an invasion against French and German forces in Africa that would be logistically difficult to pull off—given the fact that the invasion would take place on a continent distant from the United States and America’s growing base in England—and strategically questionable for a couple of reasons. First, the Germans would not have to divert as many of their resources from the war against the Soviet Union to cover North Africa as they would if the Allied attack were a cross-channel invasion of France. Second, assuming a successful invasion (a big question mark in many people’s minds), how could the capture of North Africa help in the ultimate goal of striking directly and fatally at the heart of Nazi Germany? Between a victorious Allied army in North Africa and Adolf Hitler stood the Mediterranean Sea, Italy, and the Alps—hardly a smooth path to Berlin.
Essentially, American military leaders—Marshall and Eisenhower chief among them—felt that chasing Germans “a thousand miles southof London … when there were plenty of Wehrmacht troops stationed less than twenty-five miles from Dover” was an absurdity. And there was more than a little grousing that the British preference for a North African invasion was grounded as much in that nation’s desire to maintain its control over Egypt, the Suez Canal, and its Middle Eastern interests as in its desire to quicken the pace of the war and ultimately achieve Allied victory.
But there were considerations beyond the strategic. This was the first great joint venture in the war for the Allies, and while by means of its wealth and production capabilities, the United States had supplanted Great Britain as the most important member of the coalition, it still had to be respectful of the political considerations involved. The truth of the matter was that at this moment, the two needed to cooperate, and the Soviet Union desperately needed some relief from the intensity of German attack. There was also a domestic political consideration for the man who would ultimately decide on the pursuit of Operation Torch, as it came to be known. Franklin Delano Roosevelt knew that the American people were anxious to join the
Spain’s role in the matter was likewise crucial. As Eisenhower would later put it, “there was a lively danger” that the Germans would attack through Axis-friendly Spain, threatening the strategically crucialBritish-held Gibraltar and the invasion itself. With Gibraltar in the hands of Germany the Allied forces would be sealed off within the Mediterranean, a devastating situation for the invaders.
Finally, there was the matter of what the French themselves would do. Would French colonists consider an invasion force in North Africa liberators or an enemy violating the neutrality of the region? Would the French in North Africa fight or not?
And once engaged in North Africa, the Allies would, by virtue of commitment of resources to the action, be fully engaged. Even if the French met them on the beaches of the Mediterranean and Atlantic waving banners and cheering, the Allied forces would still have to battle German Panzer divisions, which would soon be racing across the desert to halt them. The fear in American quarters was that an attack in North Africa would ultimately run from the Red Sea to the Atlantic and take the rest of 1942 and well into 1943 to carry out. It would inevitably force a delay in the assault against the strength of Germany’s European forces in France.
For American doubters of the strategy, the question was why American forces should waste manpower and treasure in an invasion against French and German forces in Africa that would be logistically difficult to pull off—given the fact that the invasion would take place on a continent distant from the United States and America’s growing base in England—and strategically questionable for a couple of reasons. First, the Germans would not have to divert as many of their resources from the war against the Soviet Union to cover North Africa as they would if the Allied attack were a cross-channel invasion of France. Second, assuming a successful invasion (a big question mark in many people’s minds), how could the capture of North Africa help in the ultimate goal of striking directly and fatally at the heart of Nazi Germany? Between a victorious Allied army in North Africa and Adolf Hitler stood the Mediterranean Sea, Italy, and the Alps—hardly a smooth path to Berlin.
Essentially, American military leaders—Marshall and Eisenhower chief among them—felt that chasing Germans “a thousand miles southof London … when there were plenty of Wehrmacht troops stationed less than twenty-five miles from Dover” was an absurdity. And there was more than a little grousing that the British preference for a North African invasion was grounded as much in that nation’s desire to maintain its control over Egypt, the Suez Canal, and its Middle Eastern interests as in its desire to quicken the pace of the war and ultimately achieve Allied victory.
But there were considerations beyond the strategic. This was the first great joint venture in the war for the Allies, and while by means of its wealth and production capabilities, the United States had supplanted Great Britain as the most important member of the coalition, it still had to be respectful of the political considerations involved. The truth of the matter was that at this moment, the two needed to cooperate, and the Soviet Union desperately needed some relief from the intensity of German attack. There was also a domestic political consideration for the man who would ultimately decide on the pursuit of Operation Torch, as it came to be known. Franklin Delano Roosevelt knew that the American people were anxious to join the
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