enemies—an approach that would yield immense dividends in theaters throughout the world in the decades to follow. Of course, ⅔ would continue to carry this tradition forward in Afghanistan’s Hindu Kush during their deployment over two centuries in the wake of O’Bannon and his mens’ work with indigenous fighters in the North African desert.
Counterinsurgency, or as the Marines often call the mission type, “COIN,” requires troops to work closely with local populations—proving their intention to aid and not to conquer and gaining a population’s trust and allegiance—to root out terrorists, insurgents, even rank criminals, securing and stabilizing a region to lay the foundation for rebuilding towns, villages, and basic infrastructure like water wells and smooth, all-season roads. Successful counterinsurgency campaigns engender economic development, improved education and healthcare institutions, capable and honest security agencies, and inspire the rise of democratic regional and national governments out of the ashes of oppression—goals ⅔ would steadfastly pursue during their deployment to Afghanistan in 2005. A counterinsurgency fight, while often “going kinetic” for short periods of time, will typically have Marines sending food, fuel, generators, bandages, and clean water “downrange” far more often than 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm rounds. Due to the expeditionary capability of the Marine Corps to go anywhere on the planet within just days or even hours to support American interests—from merging into global wars to interdicting small village-to-village skirmishes—the Marine Corps has engaged in countless tiny, yet significant, COIN fights around the world throughout its history, not to mention its undertaking of an array of noncombat humanitarian aid and assistance missions. Tactically far removed from the renowned amphibious assaults of distant beaches or the overland charges into walls of hardened enemy troops, Marines would weave the subtle concepts and practices of the counterinsurgency fight—like simply determining friend from adversary on a dusty third-world alleyway—deep into their doctrinal fabric through their decades of combat.
Some of the most significant U.S. Marine Corps COIN campaigns occurred early in the twentieth century, in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Panama, Honduras, and Haiti, in what would become known as the “Banana Wars,” a name derived from American agricultural interests (foremost the United Fruit Company) having benefitted from the outcomes of these interventions against destabilizing insurgencies. For the Marines (and other service branches that would establish units to engage in counterinsurgency operations in years following the Banana Wars), one of the most significant outcomes of this era would be the codification of their unique style of fighting small guerrilla armies and bands of insurgents into book form: the Small Wars Manual . First published in 1935, the Small Wars Manual covered a wide range of diverse topics including tactics, psychology, supply plans, the occupation of towns, armed native organizations, light artillery, and animal transportation, among a series of other topics. The counterinsurgency precepts outlined in the Small Wars Manual , combined with the U.S. Marine Corps institution pioneered by O’Bannon of working closely with local fighters aligned with American interests, founded the conceptual warfighting framework on which ⅔ would build its success in Afghanistan. In the words of Major Rob Scott, ⅔’s executive officer during his address to the battalion’s officer corps while training for their Afghan deployment, “Gentlemen, the Small Wars Manual will be our Bible in this fight.”
Despite the achievements of the U.S. Marine Corps over the course of more than two centuries in places like the remote Pacific, Europe, Vietnam, the Caribbean, North Africa, Central America, and beyond, most American civilians (and even many
Counterinsurgency, or as the Marines often call the mission type, “COIN,” requires troops to work closely with local populations—proving their intention to aid and not to conquer and gaining a population’s trust and allegiance—to root out terrorists, insurgents, even rank criminals, securing and stabilizing a region to lay the foundation for rebuilding towns, villages, and basic infrastructure like water wells and smooth, all-season roads. Successful counterinsurgency campaigns engender economic development, improved education and healthcare institutions, capable and honest security agencies, and inspire the rise of democratic regional and national governments out of the ashes of oppression—goals ⅔ would steadfastly pursue during their deployment to Afghanistan in 2005. A counterinsurgency fight, while often “going kinetic” for short periods of time, will typically have Marines sending food, fuel, generators, bandages, and clean water “downrange” far more often than 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm rounds. Due to the expeditionary capability of the Marine Corps to go anywhere on the planet within just days or even hours to support American interests—from merging into global wars to interdicting small village-to-village skirmishes—the Marine Corps has engaged in countless tiny, yet significant, COIN fights around the world throughout its history, not to mention its undertaking of an array of noncombat humanitarian aid and assistance missions. Tactically far removed from the renowned amphibious assaults of distant beaches or the overland charges into walls of hardened enemy troops, Marines would weave the subtle concepts and practices of the counterinsurgency fight—like simply determining friend from adversary on a dusty third-world alleyway—deep into their doctrinal fabric through their decades of combat.
Some of the most significant U.S. Marine Corps COIN campaigns occurred early in the twentieth century, in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Panama, Honduras, and Haiti, in what would become known as the “Banana Wars,” a name derived from American agricultural interests (foremost the United Fruit Company) having benefitted from the outcomes of these interventions against destabilizing insurgencies. For the Marines (and other service branches that would establish units to engage in counterinsurgency operations in years following the Banana Wars), one of the most significant outcomes of this era would be the codification of their unique style of fighting small guerrilla armies and bands of insurgents into book form: the Small Wars Manual . First published in 1935, the Small Wars Manual covered a wide range of diverse topics including tactics, psychology, supply plans, the occupation of towns, armed native organizations, light artillery, and animal transportation, among a series of other topics. The counterinsurgency precepts outlined in the Small Wars Manual , combined with the U.S. Marine Corps institution pioneered by O’Bannon of working closely with local fighters aligned with American interests, founded the conceptual warfighting framework on which ⅔ would build its success in Afghanistan. In the words of Major Rob Scott, ⅔’s executive officer during his address to the battalion’s officer corps while training for their Afghan deployment, “Gentlemen, the Small Wars Manual will be our Bible in this fight.”
Despite the achievements of the U.S. Marine Corps over the course of more than two centuries in places like the remote Pacific, Europe, Vietnam, the Caribbean, North Africa, Central America, and beyond, most American civilians (and even many
Similar Books
