Winston Churchill's War Leadership by Sir Martin Gilbert
Authors: Sir Martin Gilbert
Tags: Fiction
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Britain. He took a personal interest in enhancing the heavy gun defences of Dover, which was under direct German bombardment from across the Channel. His concern for the public welfare led to probing questions about the availability of gas masks and the construction of air-raid shelters. He took a lead in ensuring that proper compensation would be given to those whose homes had been destroyed by German bombs. He monitored the secrecy and security of military plans with close attention and constant suggestions for improvement.
Weaponry and equipment had always fascinated Churchill: in 1895 his first Intelligence task, given to him by British Military Intelligence, had been to examine at first hand in Cuba the efficacy of the new Spanish rifle being used against the insurgents there. During the Second World War he kept a close watch on all weapons and equipment developments. In May 1942, after studying a plan for artificial harbours—an essential component of the cross-Channel landings two years later—he asked the experts to look into the possibility of floating piers that would “float up and down with the tide.” The anchor problem, he added, “must be mastered.” And the landing ships “must have a side-flap cut in them and a drawbridge large enough to overreach the moorings of the piers.” This was done, and the floating piers became an integral part of the harbours that were built—one for the British and one for the Americans. In April 1944, reading a proposal for the return of adult and child evacuees from Canada and the United States on board the converted troopship
Mauretania
, he wrote: “There must not be more people on this ship, with the women and children, than can be carried in the boats.” Attention to detail, to small detail, and yet always with a clear purpose: with the floating piers, to make the cross-Channel landings less dangerous; and with the lifeboats, to ensure the safety of the returning evacuees (aged seven and a half, I was on board that ship).
In all his requests for detailed studies and practical action, Churchill sought positive, hopeful, constructive answers. That, too, was an aspect of his leadership: the optimistic quest. As he wrote at the end of his suggestions for the floating piers: “Let me have the best solutions worked out. Don’t argue the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves.”
Churchill had enormous powers, both as Prime Minister and as Minister of Defence. Because he had established a National Government (he called it the “Grand Coalition”) and had brought members of all political parties into the highest positions, parliamentary opposition was effectively limited to a handful of malcontents whose dissatisfaction focused more on their exclusion from influence than on specific policies. But Churchill was careful not to abuse the power he had accrued. Reflecting on his new-found authority, he wrote, almost a decade later: “Power, for the sake of lording it over fellow-creatures or adding to personal pomp, is rightly judged base. But power in a national crisis, when a man believes he knows what orders should be given, is a blessing.” Twenty-five years earlier, when he had been forced out of office during the Dardanelles campaign, Churchill had written to his wife, “God for a month of power—and a good shorthand writer.” In 1940 he had both power and good shorthand writers; and he was to be Prime Minister not for a month but for almost five years.
Central to Churchill’s war leadership was his concept of the offensive: the need, as he saw it, to attack whenever possible, even when being attacked. The bombing offensive against Germany was a case in point: in its early stages it was relatively ineffective, and yet, from Churchill’s perspective, it constituted something that could be done, and could be seen to be done, to show that Britain did not have to sit back and accept whatever Germany might throw against it. In December 1939, while
Weaponry and equipment had always fascinated Churchill: in 1895 his first Intelligence task, given to him by British Military Intelligence, had been to examine at first hand in Cuba the efficacy of the new Spanish rifle being used against the insurgents there. During the Second World War he kept a close watch on all weapons and equipment developments. In May 1942, after studying a plan for artificial harbours—an essential component of the cross-Channel landings two years later—he asked the experts to look into the possibility of floating piers that would “float up and down with the tide.” The anchor problem, he added, “must be mastered.” And the landing ships “must have a side-flap cut in them and a drawbridge large enough to overreach the moorings of the piers.” This was done, and the floating piers became an integral part of the harbours that were built—one for the British and one for the Americans. In April 1944, reading a proposal for the return of adult and child evacuees from Canada and the United States on board the converted troopship
Mauretania
, he wrote: “There must not be more people on this ship, with the women and children, than can be carried in the boats.” Attention to detail, to small detail, and yet always with a clear purpose: with the floating piers, to make the cross-Channel landings less dangerous; and with the lifeboats, to ensure the safety of the returning evacuees (aged seven and a half, I was on board that ship).
In all his requests for detailed studies and practical action, Churchill sought positive, hopeful, constructive answers. That, too, was an aspect of his leadership: the optimistic quest. As he wrote at the end of his suggestions for the floating piers: “Let me have the best solutions worked out. Don’t argue the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves.”
Churchill had enormous powers, both as Prime Minister and as Minister of Defence. Because he had established a National Government (he called it the “Grand Coalition”) and had brought members of all political parties into the highest positions, parliamentary opposition was effectively limited to a handful of malcontents whose dissatisfaction focused more on their exclusion from influence than on specific policies. But Churchill was careful not to abuse the power he had accrued. Reflecting on his new-found authority, he wrote, almost a decade later: “Power, for the sake of lording it over fellow-creatures or adding to personal pomp, is rightly judged base. But power in a national crisis, when a man believes he knows what orders should be given, is a blessing.” Twenty-five years earlier, when he had been forced out of office during the Dardanelles campaign, Churchill had written to his wife, “God for a month of power—and a good shorthand writer.” In 1940 he had both power and good shorthand writers; and he was to be Prime Minister not for a month but for almost five years.
Central to Churchill’s war leadership was his concept of the offensive: the need, as he saw it, to attack whenever possible, even when being attacked. The bombing offensive against Germany was a case in point: in its early stages it was relatively ineffective, and yet, from Churchill’s perspective, it constituted something that could be done, and could be seen to be done, to show that Britain did not have to sit back and accept whatever Germany might throw against it. In December 1939, while
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