opened it to Law’s censure that there had been a ‘plot against Ulster’. 33 There is no evidence for this, but it is hard to explain the sudden lurch towards ‘precautionary’ movements on 14 March, since the Ulster crisis was no worse then than it had been before that date; perhaps government ministers did not so much plot against Ulster as bluff against Ulster.
Whatever the official motives, Ulster unionists rejoiced at the failure of the ‘plot’. Paramilitary organisations could act, it seemed, with impunity. But nationalist suspicions at the partiality of the official and military response to the UVF was shown when, on 26 July 1914, the Irish Volunteers emulated the UVF and landed guns and ammunition at Howth, near Dublin, but this time openly and in daylight. Clumsy efforts by the police and then the army to intercept and disarm the Volunteers resulted in soldiers opening fire on civilians who were goading them, resulting in the death of three people and the wounding of thirty eight.
While these dramatic events unfolded, efforts were being made between government and opposition to reach some kind of compromise that would save John Redmond’s face and prove acceptable to the unionists, British, Ulster and Irish. Given that so many parties had to be satisfied, it is hardly surprising that the prospects were not good. Law, for his part, was not hankering after civil war; his belief was that, as he wrote to Dicey in June 1913, ‘the best chance of avoiding civil war, or something like it, is to convince ministers that we are in earnest.’ 34 But this desire to show earnestness drove him into dangerous waters, including the idea of amending the annual Army Act, which was passed to legalise the existence of the armed forces for the next twelve months (this again was a legacy of the seventeenth century ‘Glorious Revolution’ and King James II’s determination to use the army to fight for his throne). The unionist leadership discussed this in 1912, and again in 1913, with the intention of amending it to prevent the use of troops to coerce Ulster, but finally abandoned the plan in March 1914 when, indeed, the Curragh episode made it redundant. 35 Carson spoke the language of rebellion, but feared the outcome if matters were put to the proof. 36 Sir James Craig, for the Ulster unionists, went on with his preparations for such an event. Southern Irish unionists looked with alarm on the efforts being made by all sides to find a compromise, for these became more focused on the expedient of finding some special treatment for Ulster, or part of it, and abandoning the rest of Ireland to home rule. Not all British unionists were satisfied with seeking a compromise of the Union in the form of special treatment for Ulster unionists. Irish home rulers were uneasy about what concessions might be demanded of them in order to disarm Ulster unionist resistance. They had also the substantial Catholic population in Ulster to consider.
The Liberal government, seeking to find a compromise, was obliged to put pressure on John Redmond on the Ulster issue, for where else was compromise to come from? A survey of the attempts made to offer special treatment for Ulster, with some form of exclusion from the home rule bill for some period of time, and for some area of the province, shows how the Liberals were retreating from the Gladstonian tradition of seeing Ireland as the unit of devolution, with safeguards for individuals, to one that saw Ulster or perhaps four or six counties of it, as a bloc to be excluded. On 9 March 1914 Asquith proposed an amendment to the home rule bill that would allow the electorate of each Ulster county, with Belfast and Londonderry, to vote whether it wished to opt out of home rule for six years. The time limit was fixed so that before it expired the electors of the United Kingdom would have been twice consulted (i.e. not later than December 1915 and not later than December 1920); and if it ratified the
Whatever the official motives, Ulster unionists rejoiced at the failure of the ‘plot’. Paramilitary organisations could act, it seemed, with impunity. But nationalist suspicions at the partiality of the official and military response to the UVF was shown when, on 26 July 1914, the Irish Volunteers emulated the UVF and landed guns and ammunition at Howth, near Dublin, but this time openly and in daylight. Clumsy efforts by the police and then the army to intercept and disarm the Volunteers resulted in soldiers opening fire on civilians who were goading them, resulting in the death of three people and the wounding of thirty eight.
While these dramatic events unfolded, efforts were being made between government and opposition to reach some kind of compromise that would save John Redmond’s face and prove acceptable to the unionists, British, Ulster and Irish. Given that so many parties had to be satisfied, it is hardly surprising that the prospects were not good. Law, for his part, was not hankering after civil war; his belief was that, as he wrote to Dicey in June 1913, ‘the best chance of avoiding civil war, or something like it, is to convince ministers that we are in earnest.’ 34 But this desire to show earnestness drove him into dangerous waters, including the idea of amending the annual Army Act, which was passed to legalise the existence of the armed forces for the next twelve months (this again was a legacy of the seventeenth century ‘Glorious Revolution’ and King James II’s determination to use the army to fight for his throne). The unionist leadership discussed this in 1912, and again in 1913, with the intention of amending it to prevent the use of troops to coerce Ulster, but finally abandoned the plan in March 1914 when, indeed, the Curragh episode made it redundant. 35 Carson spoke the language of rebellion, but feared the outcome if matters were put to the proof. 36 Sir James Craig, for the Ulster unionists, went on with his preparations for such an event. Southern Irish unionists looked with alarm on the efforts being made by all sides to find a compromise, for these became more focused on the expedient of finding some special treatment for Ulster, or part of it, and abandoning the rest of Ireland to home rule. Not all British unionists were satisfied with seeking a compromise of the Union in the form of special treatment for Ulster unionists. Irish home rulers were uneasy about what concessions might be demanded of them in order to disarm Ulster unionist resistance. They had also the substantial Catholic population in Ulster to consider.
The Liberal government, seeking to find a compromise, was obliged to put pressure on John Redmond on the Ulster issue, for where else was compromise to come from? A survey of the attempts made to offer special treatment for Ulster, with some form of exclusion from the home rule bill for some period of time, and for some area of the province, shows how the Liberals were retreating from the Gladstonian tradition of seeing Ireland as the unit of devolution, with safeguards for individuals, to one that saw Ulster or perhaps four or six counties of it, as a bloc to be excluded. On 9 March 1914 Asquith proposed an amendment to the home rule bill that would allow the electorate of each Ulster county, with Belfast and Londonderry, to vote whether it wished to opt out of home rule for six years. The time limit was fixed so that before it expired the electors of the United Kingdom would have been twice consulted (i.e. not later than December 1915 and not later than December 1920); and if it ratified the
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