the disturbance and call for help’. No rifles or revolvers were to be used ‘until the last extremity’ and indiscriminate revolver firing was ‘strictly forbidden’. Revolvers were not authorised in the UVF and any Volunteer carrying one ‘does so on his own responsibility, and must take the consequences if arrested’. 25
Hall was harking back to the Volunteer movement of the late eighteenth century, when the Irish Volunteers (almost exclusively Protestant) were deployed on law and order tasks, as well as defying the British government. But the question was what would happen if the Liberal government of 1914 sought to assert its authority by deploying the British army against the UVF (which the British government of the 1770s had not done). The unionist peer, the Earl of Selborne, who enjoyed cordial relations with several senior Liberals, warned that if the government attempted to ‘crush Ulster with the army and fleet’, then Ulster’s resistance ‘would take all the forms, with which we are familiar in the history of such cases, some heroic and some hideous’. ‘Russian methods’ must fail. 26 Dicey took the ominous, and probably accurate, view that if the shooting began, ‘British soldiers will, in any case, do their duty, and not forget that the primary duty of the soldier is obedience to lawful orders.’ 27
It was hard for any British government, not least a Liberal government, to weigh up the consequences of using force to crush Ulster unionist resistance. There was, as so often in politics, a balance of evils to be assessed. What confounded the Liberals was their bungled attempt, not to crush, but perhaps overawe the UVF in March 1914, when it was still a poorly armed organisation. On 14 March 1914 Winston Churchill warned in a speech in Bradford that it was time ‘to go forward and put these grave matters to the proof ’. 28 On the same day the war office wrote to Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Paget (commander in chief in Ireland) that ‘evil-disposed persons’ may try ‘to obtain possession of arms, ammunition and other government stores’. Steps must be taken to safeguard depots in the north, but also in the south of Ireland. 29 At a meeting on 19 March at which Winston Churchill and Augustine Birrell, the chief secretary for Ireland, were present, Paget was told that the third battle squadron of the royal navy was to be sent to Lamlash in Scotland ‘in order to be available if required’. 30 Paget was concerned about the impact of sudden troop movements in the middle of a political crisis and on 20 March gave the impression to his senior officers that the army might soon engage the UVF, in which case Ireland might be ‘ablaze by Saturday, and would lead to something more serious than quelling of local disturbances’. He said that the war office had authorised him to inform officers domiciled in Ulster that they might be excused duties, and permitted to ‘disappear’ from Ireland, but others would not be thus permitted to choose whether or not they would obey orders. Brigadier General Sir Hubert Gough admitted that he could not claim exemption as a resident of Ulster, but added that ‘on account of birth and upbringing, and many friendships, he did not see how he could bear arms against the Ulster loyalists, and that, if he did take up arms against them, he could never face his friends again.’
Fifty seven out of seventy officers of the third cavalry brigade at the Curragh camp responded that, if their duty involved the initiation of active military operations against Ulster, they would chose dismissal. 31 When Gough and three senior commanders went to London to meet Seely (the secretary for war) the following Sunday, the minister acknowledged in writing that the government had no intention of using the armed forces to ‘coerce Ulster’. 32 This concession was withdrawn by the government and Seely resigned on 25 March, but the episode cost the government its credibility, and
Hall was harking back to the Volunteer movement of the late eighteenth century, when the Irish Volunteers (almost exclusively Protestant) were deployed on law and order tasks, as well as defying the British government. But the question was what would happen if the Liberal government of 1914 sought to assert its authority by deploying the British army against the UVF (which the British government of the 1770s had not done). The unionist peer, the Earl of Selborne, who enjoyed cordial relations with several senior Liberals, warned that if the government attempted to ‘crush Ulster with the army and fleet’, then Ulster’s resistance ‘would take all the forms, with which we are familiar in the history of such cases, some heroic and some hideous’. ‘Russian methods’ must fail. 26 Dicey took the ominous, and probably accurate, view that if the shooting began, ‘British soldiers will, in any case, do their duty, and not forget that the primary duty of the soldier is obedience to lawful orders.’ 27
It was hard for any British government, not least a Liberal government, to weigh up the consequences of using force to crush Ulster unionist resistance. There was, as so often in politics, a balance of evils to be assessed. What confounded the Liberals was their bungled attempt, not to crush, but perhaps overawe the UVF in March 1914, when it was still a poorly armed organisation. On 14 March 1914 Winston Churchill warned in a speech in Bradford that it was time ‘to go forward and put these grave matters to the proof ’. 28 On the same day the war office wrote to Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Paget (commander in chief in Ireland) that ‘evil-disposed persons’ may try ‘to obtain possession of arms, ammunition and other government stores’. Steps must be taken to safeguard depots in the north, but also in the south of Ireland. 29 At a meeting on 19 March at which Winston Churchill and Augustine Birrell, the chief secretary for Ireland, were present, Paget was told that the third battle squadron of the royal navy was to be sent to Lamlash in Scotland ‘in order to be available if required’. 30 Paget was concerned about the impact of sudden troop movements in the middle of a political crisis and on 20 March gave the impression to his senior officers that the army might soon engage the UVF, in which case Ireland might be ‘ablaze by Saturday, and would lead to something more serious than quelling of local disturbances’. He said that the war office had authorised him to inform officers domiciled in Ulster that they might be excused duties, and permitted to ‘disappear’ from Ireland, but others would not be thus permitted to choose whether or not they would obey orders. Brigadier General Sir Hubert Gough admitted that he could not claim exemption as a resident of Ulster, but added that ‘on account of birth and upbringing, and many friendships, he did not see how he could bear arms against the Ulster loyalists, and that, if he did take up arms against them, he could never face his friends again.’
Fifty seven out of seventy officers of the third cavalry brigade at the Curragh camp responded that, if their duty involved the initiation of active military operations against Ulster, they would chose dismissal. 31 When Gough and three senior commanders went to London to meet Seely (the secretary for war) the following Sunday, the minister acknowledged in writing that the government had no intention of using the armed forces to ‘coerce Ulster’. 32 This concession was withdrawn by the government and Seely resigned on 25 March, but the episode cost the government its credibility, and
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