inclusion of the excluded counties, then Ulster should have no cause for resistance. In June 1914 an amending bill offering ‘county option’ for six years was introduced in the House of Lords by Lord Crewe, but the peers rejected it and voted instead for the permanent exclusion of the whole of Ulster. On July 21–4 a conference held at Buckingham palace between the party leaders failed to find a way out of the dilemma: Redmond would go no further than county option, which meant the exclusion of four Ulster counties; Law wanted six; Carson demanded the ‘clean cut’ of the whole province of Ulster. Asquith was prepared to give way on the time limit for exclusion, but suggested leaving out of the bill south Tyrone, north Fermanagh and the four north eastern counties, except for south Armagh. This was unacceptable to both unionists and nationalists. 37
United Kingdom participation in the European war on 4 August forced the issue. John Redmond used all his influence, such as it was, with the government to oblige it to pass the home rule bill. 38 In any event Asquith could hardly take the country into war with the Irish and Ulster questions utterly unresolved. His compromise was that the home rule bill be placed on the statute book, but accompanied by a suspensory Act ‘for twelve months or such later date (not being later than the end of the present war) as may be fixed by His Majesty by Order in Council.’ He promised an amending bill dealing with the Ulster question, and when the bill was given formal assent on 18 September Asquith conceded that the coercion of unionist Ulster was an ‘absolutely unthinkable thing’. 39
The war worked immediate changes on the Irish political scene. In a sense it marked a closure of the Ulster crisis, for within a short time Carson and Redmond respectively pledged the Ulster and the Irish Volunteers to the British war effort. In so doing both made concessions. Carson had hoped in August 1914 to pledge the UVF to the British side, with two battalions to be sent abroad, but only if the home rule bill were postponed. 40 But when the government pressed on with its bill (much to the disgust of British unionists) Carson, a thorough-going imperial patriot, could hardly stand over his demand. Redmond came best out of the last stages of the bill, because he had after all gained what not even the great Parnell sought – a home rule measure on the statute book. Furthermore, by urging the Irish Volunteers to ‘take their place in the firing line in this contest’ he had (as one of his severest critics William O’Brien acknowledged) made the best possible use of the Volunteers: ‘in fighting England’s battle in the particular circumstances of [the] war … they were fighting the most effective battle for Ireland’s liberty.’ 41
Yet Redmond did not yet have his parliament; and if Irish nationalist disillusionment with the war were to surface, then he might be in an awkward position. But this is not to say that any such disillusionment would have seriously undermined Redmond’s position, though his very success in getting the home rule bill passed into law further reduced his room for manoeuvre. He could hardly refuse to help the war effort, especially as Ireland’s friends in the British empire (and Redmond had and valued such friends) were enthusiastic supporters of the British war effort. On the Ulster unionist side there is evidence that some at least believed that the UVF as the sharp edge of resistance was a spent force. Lord Dunleath of Co. Down, describing himself as ‘one of the Pioneers of the Volunteer Movement’, wrote to Carson on 9 March 1915 that the general idea in the minds of the men who promoted and organised this movement was to give as strong an expression as possible of their resolve to resist the policy of home rule. Speeches in and out of parliament, and monster demonstrations in Ulster, had apparently failed to interest the English and Scotch electors, or to
United Kingdom participation in the European war on 4 August forced the issue. John Redmond used all his influence, such as it was, with the government to oblige it to pass the home rule bill. 38 In any event Asquith could hardly take the country into war with the Irish and Ulster questions utterly unresolved. His compromise was that the home rule bill be placed on the statute book, but accompanied by a suspensory Act ‘for twelve months or such later date (not being later than the end of the present war) as may be fixed by His Majesty by Order in Council.’ He promised an amending bill dealing with the Ulster question, and when the bill was given formal assent on 18 September Asquith conceded that the coercion of unionist Ulster was an ‘absolutely unthinkable thing’. 39
The war worked immediate changes on the Irish political scene. In a sense it marked a closure of the Ulster crisis, for within a short time Carson and Redmond respectively pledged the Ulster and the Irish Volunteers to the British war effort. In so doing both made concessions. Carson had hoped in August 1914 to pledge the UVF to the British side, with two battalions to be sent abroad, but only if the home rule bill were postponed. 40 But when the government pressed on with its bill (much to the disgust of British unionists) Carson, a thorough-going imperial patriot, could hardly stand over his demand. Redmond came best out of the last stages of the bill, because he had after all gained what not even the great Parnell sought – a home rule measure on the statute book. Furthermore, by urging the Irish Volunteers to ‘take their place in the firing line in this contest’ he had (as one of his severest critics William O’Brien acknowledged) made the best possible use of the Volunteers: ‘in fighting England’s battle in the particular circumstances of [the] war … they were fighting the most effective battle for Ireland’s liberty.’ 41
Yet Redmond did not yet have his parliament; and if Irish nationalist disillusionment with the war were to surface, then he might be in an awkward position. But this is not to say that any such disillusionment would have seriously undermined Redmond’s position, though his very success in getting the home rule bill passed into law further reduced his room for manoeuvre. He could hardly refuse to help the war effort, especially as Ireland’s friends in the British empire (and Redmond had and valued such friends) were enthusiastic supporters of the British war effort. On the Ulster unionist side there is evidence that some at least believed that the UVF as the sharp edge of resistance was a spent force. Lord Dunleath of Co. Down, describing himself as ‘one of the Pioneers of the Volunteer Movement’, wrote to Carson on 9 March 1915 that the general idea in the minds of the men who promoted and organised this movement was to give as strong an expression as possible of their resolve to resist the policy of home rule. Speeches in and out of parliament, and monster demonstrations in Ulster, had apparently failed to interest the English and Scotch electors, or to
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