Delta Force by Charlie A. Beckwith

Forces capability, but an SAS one; not only a force of teachers, but a force of doers. I’d been sent over to have a dialogue with the Brits, to learn and to teach. But I’d learned this was no exchange. Instead of showing them things the Special Forces did, I kept busy just trying to keep up with what I was learning.
    I did recognize some things the SAS didn’t do as well as our people. In certain areas we could plan better than they could; we could be more methodical. I felt the Brits went too fast. There wasn’t always a need for their great haste to do things. I understood that if we could take the Brits’ technique and combine it with our planning methodology we’d really have something.
    Equally important with stating what a unit could do was articulating what that unit couldn’t, or shouldn’t, do. In the SAS, because of their fear of being misused, I learned that they were very sensitive to what they couldn’t do. Needless to say, a rifle company can also be misused. It’s no different in the field of Special Operations. It may be worse. Misuse a force that’s taken years to put together and all that time, energy, and skill will be wasted. The SAS didn’t want one of its squadrons to be plugged into an infantry battalion as if it were any ordinary replacement unit. It would be a total misuse. Another misapplication of the Special Ops principle is to give one of these units terrain to hold and defend. The outfit is mean and lean, and a large investment has been made in the training of its people. It needs to be used in a strategic offensive role. You want to use it where it can hurt the enemy the most when he isn’t looking.
    The SAS had a very broad definition of what it does and remained flexible. The American Army was quite the opposite. We would go to a greatdeal of trouble to frame a Field Manual. The FM for Special Forces is 31–21. We’d gone to a great deal of trouble and expense to spell out very, very clearly what the mission of the Special Forces is. If it doesn’t happen to be in the FM, no matter how good an idea it is, it won’t get done. All our demolition recipes are recorded; all our communication procedures are spelled out. The Brits would never do that. They kept everything in their heads. If you aren’t smart enough to keep it up there, they felt, you get your hat and go somewhere else to work.
    My tour in England was up. I departed 22 SAS. I was a totally different person from the brash, regimented Green Beret captain who’d arrived a year earlier. I felt I had more confidence in myself than ever before in my life. I felt I had captured a new world. I knew in England I had stumbled upon a concept that, when welded with the American system, would improve many of the things we did in the Special Forces. I was enthusiastic and elated with all I’d learned and was eager to share it.
    I expected to be welcomed with open arms when I arrived home. People would sit down with me and pick my brain. I’d be asked to write reports, draft papers. My debriefing period would be two weeks, maybe three. It had cost money to send me to England, and I knew our people would want to know what I’d learned.
    I requested to go back to the States by ship. Those five days at sea could be devoted to writing a paper that would be the basic document for everything I wanted to accomplish. I had so much in my mind and needed the time to sort everything out. I worked long and hard putting together my report, confident in the knowledge that people were going to be anxious to read it. My idealism was boundless. Midway across the Atlantic I suggested to Katherine, “Why don’t you take the girls and pay a visit to your mom and dad. I’m sure I’m going to be very busy for the first few weeks.” I knew I was going to be really jumping, getting things moving, making myself available to everyone who was waiting to talk to