of twelve men, while Murphy, as discussed earlier, faced a firing squad of six men. There are other variations in the number of men who were in a firing squad and there is no evidence to suggest how these numbers were arrived at.
Captain T.H. Westmacott was the assistant provost marshal of the 1st Indian Cavalry Division and in order to gain instruction into the conduct of executions, he attended an execution on 14 April 1916 of Private Edward Bolton of the 1st Cheshire Regiment, who had been found guilty of desertion. Private Bolton was shot by a firing squad of twelve men, with six standing and six kneeling. He attended another execution on 21 July 1916 that had a firing squad of twenty-five men (five men from each squadron). On this occasion, although five bullets had gone through the disc pinned to the man’s chest, the man still continued to breathe, and so Westmacott had to shoot him through the heart with his revolver to finish the affair.
Private Frank O’Neill of the 1st Sherwood Foresters was executed on 16 May 1915 by a firing squad of six men, only two of whom had a loaded rifle. Private William Scotton, 4th Middlesex Regiment, faced a firing squad of eight men on 3 February 1915, and the rest of his unit was ordered to witness his fate, while Private William Turpic, 2nd East Surrey Regiment, faced a firing squad of twelve men on 1 July 1915.
† † †
On occasions, soldiers at a base camp recovering from wounds that stopped them from fighting at the front – but which their officers thought did not preclude them from firing a rifle – were used to form a firing squad. To the pain and trauma of being wounded was then added the horror of shooting one of their own.
Sometimes an accused man would be taken to a military prison behind the lines where he would be tried. If convicted and the sentence was confirmed then it would be the responsibility of the prison commandant to provide a firing squad, in which case he might turn to the military police who guarded the prison or a military police unit nearby to provide a firing squad.
† † †
There is some anecdotal evidence that an order to form part of a firing squad was the only order that a soldier could refuse to obey, but it has not been possible to find any reference to this in the available regulations. In Arthur (2002), Corporal Bray talks of being warned that he was to be part of a firing squad to be detailed for the execution of Private Abraham Beverstein, of the 11th Middlesex Regiment, which was due to take place on 20 March 1916. That evening ‘an old soldier … told me that it was the one thing in the Army that you could refuse to do. So I straightaway went back to the sergeant and said, “I’m sorry, but I’m not doing this”, and heard no more about it.’
It is in all probability a myth and Bray was somehow lucky to have got away with it, because if refusal was an option why would anyone have taken part? Indeed, Private Kennedy ( www.themanchesters.org ) records a soldier voicing the view that they should not be asked to be a member of a firing squad and a staff officer replying:
I can understand your feelings. I am aware that it is an unpleasant duty for all of you. It isn’t pleasant for me either. But the responsibility is not yours. It lies elsewhere and you’ve got to obey orders. So I can make no exceptions. I’m afraid you will have to go through with it.
† † †
It only takes one bullet to kill a man, and yet from the evidence discussed above, firing squads could vary in number from two up to a staggering twenty-five men. There is very little evidence, therefore, that if Guilford’s notes had been more widely disseminated they were being adhered to, though it is not clear who made the decision as to the size of the firing squad.
Various methods were used to form firing squads, ranging from chance through to the drawing of lots, asking for or bribing volunteers, or plain subterfuge. It does not seem in any
Captain T.H. Westmacott was the assistant provost marshal of the 1st Indian Cavalry Division and in order to gain instruction into the conduct of executions, he attended an execution on 14 April 1916 of Private Edward Bolton of the 1st Cheshire Regiment, who had been found guilty of desertion. Private Bolton was shot by a firing squad of twelve men, with six standing and six kneeling. He attended another execution on 21 July 1916 that had a firing squad of twenty-five men (five men from each squadron). On this occasion, although five bullets had gone through the disc pinned to the man’s chest, the man still continued to breathe, and so Westmacott had to shoot him through the heart with his revolver to finish the affair.
Private Frank O’Neill of the 1st Sherwood Foresters was executed on 16 May 1915 by a firing squad of six men, only two of whom had a loaded rifle. Private William Scotton, 4th Middlesex Regiment, faced a firing squad of eight men on 3 February 1915, and the rest of his unit was ordered to witness his fate, while Private William Turpic, 2nd East Surrey Regiment, faced a firing squad of twelve men on 1 July 1915.
† † †
On occasions, soldiers at a base camp recovering from wounds that stopped them from fighting at the front – but which their officers thought did not preclude them from firing a rifle – were used to form a firing squad. To the pain and trauma of being wounded was then added the horror of shooting one of their own.
Sometimes an accused man would be taken to a military prison behind the lines where he would be tried. If convicted and the sentence was confirmed then it would be the responsibility of the prison commandant to provide a firing squad, in which case he might turn to the military police who guarded the prison or a military police unit nearby to provide a firing squad.
† † †
There is some anecdotal evidence that an order to form part of a firing squad was the only order that a soldier could refuse to obey, but it has not been possible to find any reference to this in the available regulations. In Arthur (2002), Corporal Bray talks of being warned that he was to be part of a firing squad to be detailed for the execution of Private Abraham Beverstein, of the 11th Middlesex Regiment, which was due to take place on 20 March 1916. That evening ‘an old soldier … told me that it was the one thing in the Army that you could refuse to do. So I straightaway went back to the sergeant and said, “I’m sorry, but I’m not doing this”, and heard no more about it.’
It is in all probability a myth and Bray was somehow lucky to have got away with it, because if refusal was an option why would anyone have taken part? Indeed, Private Kennedy ( www.themanchesters.org ) records a soldier voicing the view that they should not be asked to be a member of a firing squad and a staff officer replying:
I can understand your feelings. I am aware that it is an unpleasant duty for all of you. It isn’t pleasant for me either. But the responsibility is not yours. It lies elsewhere and you’ve got to obey orders. So I can make no exceptions. I’m afraid you will have to go through with it.
† † †
It only takes one bullet to kill a man, and yet from the evidence discussed above, firing squads could vary in number from two up to a staggering twenty-five men. There is very little evidence, therefore, that if Guilford’s notes had been more widely disseminated they were being adhered to, though it is not clear who made the decision as to the size of the firing squad.
Various methods were used to form firing squads, ranging from chance through to the drawing of lots, asking for or bribing volunteers, or plain subterfuge. It does not seem in any
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