International Security: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) by Christopher S. Browning
Authors: Christopher S. Browning
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force and for what cause. This is particularly so when the UNSC is divided due to different historical, geographic, or strategic ties in relation to particular conflicts. Despite this, though, the UN appears to be increasingly willing to support missions designed to preserve and spread liberal democratic forms of governance, as demonstrated, for example, in its support for interventions in Haiti and Sierra Leone in the 1990s in response to
coups d’état
initiated against democratically elected governments. In these cases the challenge to democracy was presented as threatening international peace and security. Indeed, the UN’s post-conflict peacebuildingoperations, which seek to stabilize countries to stop them slipping back into war, are also increasingly premised on promoting liberal democratic understandings of socio-economic development and good governance. While this reflects the influence of liberal democratic peace theory discussed in Chapter 3 , for critics it also infringes established norms of sovereignty suggesting that the internal composition and organization of states should be for the state alone and not subject to international interference. Thus, while traditionally the UN limited its understanding of threats to international peace and security to violent conflicts between states, increasingly the suggestion is that such threats might also result from violent conflict and illiberal governance within them.
Finally, it is important to note that while the UN undertakes many peacekeeping missions itself, when it comes to peace enforcement it often prefers to authorize regional organizations, coalitions of the willing, and sometimes even individual states, to undertake such operations on its behalf. For instance, UN-authorized enforcement operations have been undertaken by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, and NATO, while the 1991 war against Iraq was composed of a UN-authorized US-led multinational coalition. There are various logistical benefits from delegating out peace operations in this way. For instance, regional actors can often mobilize more quickly than the UN, which lacks standing forces and has to put contingents together on a case by case basis through time-consuming processes of seeking contributions from member states. Delegation can also reduce the problems of the UN being overwhelmed by missions and spreading itself too thinly, while it is also assumed that regional actors may be better placed to respond most effectively in their own neighbourhoods. However, outside the West regional organizations often lack sufficient capabilities, while there are also concerns that delegation can reinforce the position and interests of regional hegemons. Moreover, while the UN envisions a hierarchical relationship between itself and regional actors, regional actors have occasionally openly challenged the UN’sauthority and primacy. For example, owing to Russian and Chinese opposition within the UNSC, NATO’s peace enforcement operation in Kosovo in 1999, to help prevent humanitarian abuses being undertaken against Kosovan Albanians in the context of a struggle for Kosovan independence from Serbia, took place without an explicit UN mandate. In justifying NATO’s action, however, the then US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, suggested that given its democratic credentials NATO decisions on the use of force were more legitimate than those of the UNSC with its more mixed membership.
Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect
NATO’s operation in Kosovo is important in marking something of a turning point on debates concerning the grounds upon which the international community might legitimately intervene in other states’ affairs. Until this point, intervention and enforcement actions had usually been justified on grounds of preventing conflicts spilling over and impacting on international peace and security more broadly. With its intervention in
coups d’état
initiated against democratically elected governments. In these cases the challenge to democracy was presented as threatening international peace and security. Indeed, the UN’s post-conflict peacebuildingoperations, which seek to stabilize countries to stop them slipping back into war, are also increasingly premised on promoting liberal democratic understandings of socio-economic development and good governance. While this reflects the influence of liberal democratic peace theory discussed in Chapter 3 , for critics it also infringes established norms of sovereignty suggesting that the internal composition and organization of states should be for the state alone and not subject to international interference. Thus, while traditionally the UN limited its understanding of threats to international peace and security to violent conflicts between states, increasingly the suggestion is that such threats might also result from violent conflict and illiberal governance within them.
Finally, it is important to note that while the UN undertakes many peacekeeping missions itself, when it comes to peace enforcement it often prefers to authorize regional organizations, coalitions of the willing, and sometimes even individual states, to undertake such operations on its behalf. For instance, UN-authorized enforcement operations have been undertaken by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, and NATO, while the 1991 war against Iraq was composed of a UN-authorized US-led multinational coalition. There are various logistical benefits from delegating out peace operations in this way. For instance, regional actors can often mobilize more quickly than the UN, which lacks standing forces and has to put contingents together on a case by case basis through time-consuming processes of seeking contributions from member states. Delegation can also reduce the problems of the UN being overwhelmed by missions and spreading itself too thinly, while it is also assumed that regional actors may be better placed to respond most effectively in their own neighbourhoods. However, outside the West regional organizations often lack sufficient capabilities, while there are also concerns that delegation can reinforce the position and interests of regional hegemons. Moreover, while the UN envisions a hierarchical relationship between itself and regional actors, regional actors have occasionally openly challenged the UN’sauthority and primacy. For example, owing to Russian and Chinese opposition within the UNSC, NATO’s peace enforcement operation in Kosovo in 1999, to help prevent humanitarian abuses being undertaken against Kosovan Albanians in the context of a struggle for Kosovan independence from Serbia, took place without an explicit UN mandate. In justifying NATO’s action, however, the then US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, suggested that given its democratic credentials NATO decisions on the use of force were more legitimate than those of the UNSC with its more mixed membership.
Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect
NATO’s operation in Kosovo is important in marking something of a turning point on debates concerning the grounds upon which the international community might legitimately intervene in other states’ affairs. Until this point, intervention and enforcement actions had usually been justified on grounds of preventing conflicts spilling over and impacting on international peace and security more broadly. With its intervention in
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