International Security: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) by Christopher S. Browning Page B

however, were debates sparked by the various thresholds the ICISS report outlined for legitimizing intervention in the first place. The general suggestion that intervention would be justified in situations of large-scale loss of life resulting from things like genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity was accepted. Controversial, however, was determining when such criteria had been reached. What, for example, constitutes large-scale loss of life and who decides? Indeed, one reason China and Russia vetoed a UN mandated intervention in Kosovo was because they did not think the situation was as dire as NATO claimed. Another was because in their view the point of last resort for using force (another of the ICISS criteria) had not been reached and alternative diplomatic avenues remained to be explored. NATO’s action in Kosovo and the ICISS report therefore raised the question of who has the legitimate right to make such decisions. Both NATO and the ICISS report suggested that, whileideally it should be the UNSC, if the UNSC failed to act then this authority might be devolved to other actors—regional organizations, coalitions of the willing, and perhaps even individual states. For critics the report therefore created the possibility that states could arbitrarily invoke the R2P to pursue ulterior agendas. This was a specific concern of the post-colonial states with good historical grounds to be wary of the proclaimed humanitarian intentions of former colonial powers. However, it is notable that Russia also viewed NATO’s operation in Kosovo in similar terms, as a mechanism by which NATO might be able to expand into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence.
    Following much negotiation a heavily revised version of the R2P was endorsed at the 2005 World Summit. Important revisions included the omission of explicit reference to responsibilities to prevent, react, and rebuild, with an emphasis instead placed on helping states meet their human rights commitments, for instance, through providing early warning of impending situations, offering incentives to encourage reconciliation between conflicting parties, and providing assistance in areas of economic development and political reform. Most notably, authority for determining thresholds and launching an intervention was firmly placed within the UNSC’s remit.
    Disagreements regarding the R2P, however, remain. Its most notable invocation since its adoption by the World Summit was in early 2011 when it was invoked by the UNSC in authorizing a NATO-led intervention in Libya in response to the Libyan government’s brutal crackdown against an uprising. Concerned that crimes against humanity had either been committed or were imminent unless action was taken, through Resolution 1973 the UNSC authorized the international community to take ‘all necessary measures’ in protecting civilians under threat of attack. The Resolution, however, also excluded the option of a foreign occupation of Libyan territory. Even so, the NATO-led alliance interpreted its remit more broadly than its critics. Beyond imposinga no-fly zone and targeting the Libyan air force and its air defences, NATO also targeted Libya’s armed forces and its command facilities on the ground. To its critics, like Russia and China, NATO was not simply protecting civilians but was actively taking sides in a civil war in the hope of fostering regime change.
    Beyond the specifics, however, the intervention in Libya also raised questions about the selectivity of the intervention. Why, for example, intervene in Libya and not other countries in the midst of the so-called ‘Arab spring’, where crackdowns were also taking place. The West’s refusal to countenance such action in key regional allies, like Egypt and Bahrain, raised obvious accusations of double standards and that the intervention was driven as much by a desire to advance strategic national interests, or even to settle old scores with