Lancasters had been assigned the part of the ridge that contained Hill 60 as well as Mount Sorrel. A and D Companies were in the first two waves. Harry’s C Company waited
in a newly dug trench behind the front line.
The battalion’s orders for the day are precise and chilling. In them, Lieutenant-Colonel Bowes-Wilson – who was to be killed at noon that day – writes:
At Zero, Mines under HILL 60 & the CATERPILLAR will be fired. 18-pounders [the standard British field gun] will barrage the enemy front line.
Zero + 1 [minute] Barrage lifts & will move slowly back allowing for a pace of 25 yards a minute.
Zero + 20 Barrage lifts off battalion objective & will pause about 200 yards in front of this line till zero plus 3 hours 40 minutes.
Zero + 3 hours. Barrage again lifts & allows C & D 40 minutes. Bns to advance to take their objective.
The CO goes on to describe how the three waves (Harry in the third, not the fifth as he says in a letter he sent after the action) are to cross no man’s land at 100-yard intervals. The
positions of the medical officers and dressing stations are indicated, as is the route back for stretcher cases and walking wounded.
Harry’s company is to support the first wave:
If necessary, the O.C. [officer commanding] ‘C’ Company must push on to the Bn objective to help A & B Companies gain this.
Immediately the Bn objective has been gained, a line in, or in front of this, must be consolidated. Lines must be firestepped & organized to resist counter attacks.
Wiring to be commenced as soon as possible.
All very clear. All very clinical. Of course, the firesteps in the German trenches would be facing the wrong way for defence against any counter-attack from the enemy’s rear, and the wire
would be behind what would have become the front line if the battalion took its objectives.
How did the assault go? The answer is, very well at first. As the war diary records:
The attack progressed very favourably and by zero + 30 the Bn had reached its objective and began consolidating. Very few casualties were sustained in the actual
attack.
A map showing the positions of the mines beneath the Messines–Wytschaete Ridge, and the subsequent British gains.
The remains of a German strongpoint on Mount Sorrel, the battalion’s objective on the Messines Ridge, after the detonation of the mines.
So far, so good. The 9th York and Lancasters had reached Mount Sorrel and occupied the enemy’s front-line positions there with few casualties.
The obvious strategy of carrying on with the advance beyond the first objective was not considered. The objective had been to take the high ground at the Messines Ridge and then to set up
defensive positions there.
The German Army would have been alarmed, if not dismayed, by its losses on that morning, and so rapidly responded with intense artillery fire. As the British troops had taken over the German
trenches, their positions were known precisely and the German artillery had little problem in finding the mark. The war diary, 9 June 1917, two days after the initial assault:
The Bn remained in its objectives until the evening of the 9th. During this period the Bn underwent heavy shelling & sustained many casualties. B Coy also relieved the
8th Bn Y & L in the front line on the morning of the 9th. On the evening of the 9th the Bn was relieved by the 1st N Staffs [North Staffordshire Regiment] Bn. The total casualties
sustained were officers – killed 4 (including the C.O.) wounded 6. O.R.s – Killed 39, wounded 211. Died of wounds 9. Missing 18.
The casualties represent well over a quarter of the battalion. Almost 10 per cent had been killed or were missing. (Most of the ‘missing’ were likely to have been killed by shelling,
buried by the action or simply blown to pieces.) The proportion of killed to wounded was smaller than would have been expected from an assault against machine guns. At the Somme, in some battalions
twice as many men were
in a newly dug trench behind the front line.
The battalion’s orders for the day are precise and chilling. In them, Lieutenant-Colonel Bowes-Wilson – who was to be killed at noon that day – writes:
At Zero, Mines under HILL 60 & the CATERPILLAR will be fired. 18-pounders [the standard British field gun] will barrage the enemy front line.
Zero + 1 [minute] Barrage lifts & will move slowly back allowing for a pace of 25 yards a minute.
Zero + 20 Barrage lifts off battalion objective & will pause about 200 yards in front of this line till zero plus 3 hours 40 minutes.
Zero + 3 hours. Barrage again lifts & allows C & D 40 minutes. Bns to advance to take their objective.
The CO goes on to describe how the three waves (Harry in the third, not the fifth as he says in a letter he sent after the action) are to cross no man’s land at 100-yard intervals. The
positions of the medical officers and dressing stations are indicated, as is the route back for stretcher cases and walking wounded.
Harry’s company is to support the first wave:
If necessary, the O.C. [officer commanding] ‘C’ Company must push on to the Bn objective to help A & B Companies gain this.
Immediately the Bn objective has been gained, a line in, or in front of this, must be consolidated. Lines must be firestepped & organized to resist counter attacks.
Wiring to be commenced as soon as possible.
All very clear. All very clinical. Of course, the firesteps in the German trenches would be facing the wrong way for defence against any counter-attack from the enemy’s rear, and the wire
would be behind what would have become the front line if the battalion took its objectives.
How did the assault go? The answer is, very well at first. As the war diary records:
The attack progressed very favourably and by zero + 30 the Bn had reached its objective and began consolidating. Very few casualties were sustained in the actual
attack.
A map showing the positions of the mines beneath the Messines–Wytschaete Ridge, and the subsequent British gains.
The remains of a German strongpoint on Mount Sorrel, the battalion’s objective on the Messines Ridge, after the detonation of the mines.
So far, so good. The 9th York and Lancasters had reached Mount Sorrel and occupied the enemy’s front-line positions there with few casualties.
The obvious strategy of carrying on with the advance beyond the first objective was not considered. The objective had been to take the high ground at the Messines Ridge and then to set up
defensive positions there.
The German Army would have been alarmed, if not dismayed, by its losses on that morning, and so rapidly responded with intense artillery fire. As the British troops had taken over the German
trenches, their positions were known precisely and the German artillery had little problem in finding the mark. The war diary, 9 June 1917, two days after the initial assault:
The Bn remained in its objectives until the evening of the 9th. During this period the Bn underwent heavy shelling & sustained many casualties. B Coy also relieved the
8th Bn Y & L in the front line on the morning of the 9th. On the evening of the 9th the Bn was relieved by the 1st N Staffs [North Staffordshire Regiment] Bn. The total casualties
sustained were officers – killed 4 (including the C.O.) wounded 6. O.R.s – Killed 39, wounded 211. Died of wounds 9. Missing 18.
The casualties represent well over a quarter of the battalion. Almost 10 per cent had been killed or were missing. (Most of the ‘missing’ were likely to have been killed by shelling,
buried by the action or simply blown to pieces.) The proportion of killed to wounded was smaller than would have been expected from an assault against machine guns. At the Somme, in some battalions
twice as many men were
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