members of the assembly.
New Hampshire, likewise, abolished the office of governor in the provisional new government it created early in 1776, and it made no alternative arrangement for executive functioning. Although it established a council with an elected president, it defined that body only as a “separate branch of the legislature” and assigned it no specific executive duties.
South Carolina’s provisional new government did provide for a chief executive, but it did not call him a “governor,” one who governs or rules. Instead, like New Hampshire, South Carolina called its most prominent leader a “president,” one who presides, a lesser term carried over from its Provincial Congress. Two other states, Pennsylvania and Delaware, also adopted the title “president” over “governor.”
The states devised various mechanisms for holding executive officers closely accountable. Six of the ten states that formed new constitutions within a year of independence elected their governors or presidents annually. Two states had biennial elections, the remaining two triennial. Five of the annual-election states permitted no more than three successive years in office, and only three states failed to require rotation in office, as they said at the time, or term limits, as we call it today. “A long continuance in the first executive departments of power or trust isdangerous to liberty,” the Maryland Constitution of 1776 declared. “A rotation, therefore, in those departments is one of the best securities of permanent freedom.” 13
Executive officers were not granted authority to “prorogue, adjourn, or dissolve” the legislatures. In some states this prohibition was made specific; in others the power was simply absent. One state, New York, allowed its governor to prorogue (suspend) the legislature for no more than sixty days within the period of a year, but he still could not adjourn or dissolve it. All Revolutionary-era Americans could recall, or had heard about, the many times royal governors had seized power from the people by preventing elected representatives from gathering, and they wanted none of this in their new governments.
Eight of the ten states established executive or privy councils to lessen the authority of their chief executives. Although colonists had suffered much grief at the hands of His Majesty’s Privy Council, these junior versions would help diffuse the concentration of power in the new state governments. No single executive should be empowered to act on his own will alone, they believed. An elected council, not personally beholden to a chief executive officer, would keep him from using patronage for political or economic gain. 14
Finally, and most definitively, all but two of the new constitutions denied their governors or presidents the power of the veto. Recalling how royal governors once ran roughshod over colonial assemblies, most Americans opposed giving executive officers any influence in legislative matters. The two exceptions, New York and Massachusetts, had extenuating circumstances. Governors in these states, unlike in the others, were popularly elected, so their veto was viewed as the people’s check on the legislature, and the veto was not absolute, as in colonial times. In both states, the legislature could override a gubernatorial veto with a two-thirds vote. 15
New York (1777) and Massachusetts (1780) were the last two states to adopt constitutions, and the fact that both provided for the popular election of governors and then granted these officers a limited veto power signaled an evolution in public attitudes. Couldn’t the myriad difficulties of a prolonged war be lessened by the efficient administration of a stronger governor? Particularly in states torn by fighting, proponents of executive power, once a distinct minority, finally gained some traction.
In South Carolina in 1780, with British forces staged to take over Charleston, the legislature granted its chief
New Hampshire, likewise, abolished the office of governor in the provisional new government it created early in 1776, and it made no alternative arrangement for executive functioning. Although it established a council with an elected president, it defined that body only as a “separate branch of the legislature” and assigned it no specific executive duties.
South Carolina’s provisional new government did provide for a chief executive, but it did not call him a “governor,” one who governs or rules. Instead, like New Hampshire, South Carolina called its most prominent leader a “president,” one who presides, a lesser term carried over from its Provincial Congress. Two other states, Pennsylvania and Delaware, also adopted the title “president” over “governor.”
The states devised various mechanisms for holding executive officers closely accountable. Six of the ten states that formed new constitutions within a year of independence elected their governors or presidents annually. Two states had biennial elections, the remaining two triennial. Five of the annual-election states permitted no more than three successive years in office, and only three states failed to require rotation in office, as they said at the time, or term limits, as we call it today. “A long continuance in the first executive departments of power or trust isdangerous to liberty,” the Maryland Constitution of 1776 declared. “A rotation, therefore, in those departments is one of the best securities of permanent freedom.” 13
Executive officers were not granted authority to “prorogue, adjourn, or dissolve” the legislatures. In some states this prohibition was made specific; in others the power was simply absent. One state, New York, allowed its governor to prorogue (suspend) the legislature for no more than sixty days within the period of a year, but he still could not adjourn or dissolve it. All Revolutionary-era Americans could recall, or had heard about, the many times royal governors had seized power from the people by preventing elected representatives from gathering, and they wanted none of this in their new governments.
Eight of the ten states established executive or privy councils to lessen the authority of their chief executives. Although colonists had suffered much grief at the hands of His Majesty’s Privy Council, these junior versions would help diffuse the concentration of power in the new state governments. No single executive should be empowered to act on his own will alone, they believed. An elected council, not personally beholden to a chief executive officer, would keep him from using patronage for political or economic gain. 14
Finally, and most definitively, all but two of the new constitutions denied their governors or presidents the power of the veto. Recalling how royal governors once ran roughshod over colonial assemblies, most Americans opposed giving executive officers any influence in legislative matters. The two exceptions, New York and Massachusetts, had extenuating circumstances. Governors in these states, unlike in the others, were popularly elected, so their veto was viewed as the people’s check on the legislature, and the veto was not absolute, as in colonial times. In both states, the legislature could override a gubernatorial veto with a two-thirds vote. 15
New York (1777) and Massachusetts (1780) were the last two states to adopt constitutions, and the fact that both provided for the popular election of governors and then granted these officers a limited veto power signaled an evolution in public attitudes. Couldn’t the myriad difficulties of a prolonged war be lessened by the efficient administration of a stronger governor? Particularly in states torn by fighting, proponents of executive power, once a distinct minority, finally gained some traction.
In South Carolina in 1780, with British forces staged to take over Charleston, the legislature granted its chief
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