republican principles be damned—at least for the time being, in this state of emergency.
The immediate crisis ended when Washington’s army crossed the Delaware and forced a British retreat. Then, when Congress returned to Philadelphia, it resumed business as usual, which meant government by committees, but there was no template for this, no rules or codes. Without a constitution or firm precedents, the confederationof thirteen states that had declared independence from Great Britain remained under interim management.
The embryonic nation could not go on forever like that, ruled by Congress’s seat-of-the-pants committees. To be accepted by the world as a legitimate state and, more pointedly, to attract foreign assistance in its fight against Great Britain, former colonists required a governing body that a nation such as France could reasonably do business with. This, in turn, required a more formal definition of the relationship between Congress and its component parts, thirteen diverse states that still considered themselves sovereign.
The resultant Articles of Confederation turned out to be just what its name implied, a confederation, not a government per se. The states, as sovereign entities, allocated few tasks to Congress beyond those required for coordinating the war effort and engaging with foreign countries. Yes, there would be a federal post office, but no, Congress could not raise its own funds. Even to fight the war, it would have to appeal to the states for money. Yet Congress was still expected to support and administer an army, and this required it to function in an executive capacity.
The closest thing to an executive body in the Articles was a “Committee of the States,” composed of one delegate from each state, to carry on business “in the recess of Congress.” That committee could only deal with matters that Congress, in advance, had specified, and it could “never”—a key word—tackle a wide range of the most important matters of state:
engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque or reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expences necessary for the defence and welfare of the United States, or any of them: nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war to be built or purchased or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander in chief of the army or navy. 12
The confederation’s only executive body, in short, was instructed in no uncertain terms not to take action on any matter of policy or great consequence.
Although the Articles of Confederation did not formally take effect until they were ratified by the last of the thirteen states, Maryland, on March 1, 1781, Congress used the document as a guide as it fought off the British imperial army and navy, but the Articles were of no great help. Waging a war required a host of on-the-ground executive actions that Congress and its committees, with no funds of their own and little authority over the states, were in a poor position to take.
The states, unlike Congress, had access to money through the power to levy taxes. They also had clearly defined authority and powers and were therefore in a better position to provide for executive administration. Still, with the excesses from colonial times still fresh in their minds, the state constitution makers used various mechanisms to curtail executive power. Massachusetts, the first to cast off British rule and therefore the first to need a new governmental arrangement, addressed the problem by eliminating the governorship entirely. In 1775, in the immediate aftermath of Lexington and Concord, it decided to resume its old charter in all respects—minus a separate and distinct executive. All functions formally performed by the royal governor were assumed by a council elected by
The immediate crisis ended when Washington’s army crossed the Delaware and forced a British retreat. Then, when Congress returned to Philadelphia, it resumed business as usual, which meant government by committees, but there was no template for this, no rules or codes. Without a constitution or firm precedents, the confederationof thirteen states that had declared independence from Great Britain remained under interim management.
The embryonic nation could not go on forever like that, ruled by Congress’s seat-of-the-pants committees. To be accepted by the world as a legitimate state and, more pointedly, to attract foreign assistance in its fight against Great Britain, former colonists required a governing body that a nation such as France could reasonably do business with. This, in turn, required a more formal definition of the relationship between Congress and its component parts, thirteen diverse states that still considered themselves sovereign.
The resultant Articles of Confederation turned out to be just what its name implied, a confederation, not a government per se. The states, as sovereign entities, allocated few tasks to Congress beyond those required for coordinating the war effort and engaging with foreign countries. Yes, there would be a federal post office, but no, Congress could not raise its own funds. Even to fight the war, it would have to appeal to the states for money. Yet Congress was still expected to support and administer an army, and this required it to function in an executive capacity.
The closest thing to an executive body in the Articles was a “Committee of the States,” composed of one delegate from each state, to carry on business “in the recess of Congress.” That committee could only deal with matters that Congress, in advance, had specified, and it could “never”—a key word—tackle a wide range of the most important matters of state:
engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque or reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expences necessary for the defence and welfare of the United States, or any of them: nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war to be built or purchased or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander in chief of the army or navy. 12
The confederation’s only executive body, in short, was instructed in no uncertain terms not to take action on any matter of policy or great consequence.
Although the Articles of Confederation did not formally take effect until they were ratified by the last of the thirteen states, Maryland, on March 1, 1781, Congress used the document as a guide as it fought off the British imperial army and navy, but the Articles were of no great help. Waging a war required a host of on-the-ground executive actions that Congress and its committees, with no funds of their own and little authority over the states, were in a poor position to take.
The states, unlike Congress, had access to money through the power to levy taxes. They also had clearly defined authority and powers and were therefore in a better position to provide for executive administration. Still, with the excesses from colonial times still fresh in their minds, the state constitution makers used various mechanisms to curtail executive power. Massachusetts, the first to cast off British rule and therefore the first to need a new governmental arrangement, addressed the problem by eliminating the governorship entirely. In 1775, in the immediate aftermath of Lexington and Concord, it decided to resume its old charter in all respects—minus a separate and distinct executive. All functions formally performed by the royal governor were assumed by a council elected by
Similar Books
