executive, John Rutledge, the “power to do everything necessary for the public good except the taking away the life of a citizen without legal trial.” When the British then made advances into Virginia, Governor Thomas Jefferson called the legislators together and asked for additional powers, such as the authority to draft slaves to build military fortifications. His proposals were modest, however, when compared with others’. Under attack and very nervous, Virginia’s assemblymen seriously debated whether to “have a dictator appointed,” with the “power of disposing of the lives and fortunes of the citizens thereof without being subject to account.” Although legislators rejected the notion of an all-powerful executive, they did grant Jefferson’s successor, Thomas Nelson, the authority to impress food and supplies, call forth militias and dispatch them at his will, and imprison or banish suspected Tories. 16
The desperation of war placed similar pressures on the confederated quasi-government in Philadelphia. Back in December 1776, as he struggled to keep Washington’s army in the field to defend the young nation’s capital, Robert Morris had proposed that Congress “pay good executive men to do their business as it ought to be & not lavish missions away by their own mismanagement. I say mismanagement because no men living can attend the daily deliberations of Congress & do executive part of business at the same time.” The following year Congress gave a tentative nod to Morris’s ideas by establishing a few key “boards” and appointing some men who were not delegates, but the boards possessed little money or authority, and like Congress itself they depended ultimately on the state governments.
Increasingly, as the war lengthened and deepened, Robert Morris’s call for full-time executive officers, however repugnant to republican ideals, received serious consideration. In 1780, Alexander Hamilton, Washington’s aspiring aide-de-camp who had taken upon himself the study of politics and government, presented a comprehensive plan to strengthen the confederacy and reorganize Congress. In a letter to James Duane, an influential delegate to Congress, Hamilton reiterated Robert Morris’s basic complaint—“Congress is properly a deliberative corps and it forgets itself when it attempts to play the executive”—and then outlined distinct executive departments with individuals at the helm. He even suggested which individuals would be best at these newposts: General Philip Schuyler (his soon-to-be father-in-law) as president of war, Alexander McDougall as president of marine, and Robert Morris as financier. Here was a structure that emphasized efficient management, but even Hamilton at this point stopped short of the ultimate centralization of power, a single man above the department heads, a chief executive. 17
Hamilton’s timing was perfect, for Congress was in a collective state of despair. The war, with no apparent end, was only part of the problem; equally significant was the total collapse of the economy. The value of currency issued by Congress, backed by nothing in particular, spiraled downward. By the close of 1780 a Continental dollar could not even buy a penny’s worth of goods. Few sensible investors were willing to loan money or advance goods to Congress, a body that had no viable way to raise funds other than begging from its constituent states.
Lacking both money and credit, Congress had to act decisively. On February 7, 1781, delegates resolved to create three “civil executive departments” that would be headed, as Alexander Hamilton and others had suggested, by individuals, not committees or boards. The first office listed was “Financier,” followed by “Secretary at War” and “Secretary of Marine.” The priority was clear. Without a workable financial system, nothing else was possible. 18
Less than two weeks later, Congress unanimously elected Robert Morris, who had ushered
The desperation of war placed similar pressures on the confederated quasi-government in Philadelphia. Back in December 1776, as he struggled to keep Washington’s army in the field to defend the young nation’s capital, Robert Morris had proposed that Congress “pay good executive men to do their business as it ought to be & not lavish missions away by their own mismanagement. I say mismanagement because no men living can attend the daily deliberations of Congress & do executive part of business at the same time.” The following year Congress gave a tentative nod to Morris’s ideas by establishing a few key “boards” and appointing some men who were not delegates, but the boards possessed little money or authority, and like Congress itself they depended ultimately on the state governments.
Increasingly, as the war lengthened and deepened, Robert Morris’s call for full-time executive officers, however repugnant to republican ideals, received serious consideration. In 1780, Alexander Hamilton, Washington’s aspiring aide-de-camp who had taken upon himself the study of politics and government, presented a comprehensive plan to strengthen the confederacy and reorganize Congress. In a letter to James Duane, an influential delegate to Congress, Hamilton reiterated Robert Morris’s basic complaint—“Congress is properly a deliberative corps and it forgets itself when it attempts to play the executive”—and then outlined distinct executive departments with individuals at the helm. He even suggested which individuals would be best at these newposts: General Philip Schuyler (his soon-to-be father-in-law) as president of war, Alexander McDougall as president of marine, and Robert Morris as financier. Here was a structure that emphasized efficient management, but even Hamilton at this point stopped short of the ultimate centralization of power, a single man above the department heads, a chief executive. 17
Hamilton’s timing was perfect, for Congress was in a collective state of despair. The war, with no apparent end, was only part of the problem; equally significant was the total collapse of the economy. The value of currency issued by Congress, backed by nothing in particular, spiraled downward. By the close of 1780 a Continental dollar could not even buy a penny’s worth of goods. Few sensible investors were willing to loan money or advance goods to Congress, a body that had no viable way to raise funds other than begging from its constituent states.
Lacking both money and credit, Congress had to act decisively. On February 7, 1781, delegates resolved to create three “civil executive departments” that would be headed, as Alexander Hamilton and others had suggested, by individuals, not committees or boards. The first office listed was “Financier,” followed by “Secretary at War” and “Secretary of Marine.” The priority was clear. Without a workable financial system, nothing else was possible. 18
Less than two weeks later, Congress unanimously elected Robert Morris, who had ushered
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