war, we must leapfrog the sterile arms control debate and go to the heart of the problem: the political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union and the policies we can initiate that will deter the Soviets from resorting to war to resolve those differences.
Incentives for Peace . Only when deterrence is assured candetente be effective. If the Soviets realize that aggression will not pay, they will have no choice but to behave with restraint. We can then reinforce the effect of the fear of war by providing them with the rewards of peace. Real peace requires a policy that has incentives for peace as well as disincentives for war.
Our economic power dwarfs theirs because our economic system works and theirs does not. The NATO allies and Japan outproduce the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies by a ratio of over three to one. Trade between our systems can give them an economic stake in peace and lead to greater Soviet restraint.
The Soviets need us. We know this, they know it, and we should make use of it. They are more economically dependent on us than we are on them. We largely trade Western technology for Soviet raw materials. The Soviets need access to our know-how if their economy is to grow through the end of the century. If necessary, we can go elsewhere to buy their products, but they have no alternative supplier for ours. This gives us leverage over them. We should use it to further the cause of real peace by stamping our goods with a political price tag as well as an economic one.
We should have no illusions about what trade can accomplish. Trade by itself will not produce peace or prevent war. Some contend that if we trade more with the Soviet Union, they will be less aggressive. But the Kremlin leaders cannot be bought off by trade. In the late 1970s they showed us that they would both trade and invade. At the other extreme, some contend that the increase in Soviet-American trade in the early years of detente helped fuel Soviet expansionism. This claim is preposterous. The level of trade was minuscule then; it could not possibly have affected Soviet military power. Economic relations can never substitute for deterrence. If properly implemented, they can reinforce it.
Lenin contemptuously remarked that capitalists were so short-sightedly greedy that theywould sell the communists the rope by which they themselves would someday hang. Unfortunately, some Western businessmen fit the bill. They would sell the Soviets not only rope, but also the scaffolding and a how-to book for the hangman. By refusing to look beyond the bottom line, they blithely ignore the military power the Soviets are massing on the front line.
Trade should be expanded only in ways that serve our interests. This means that we must not sell the Soviets goods and technology that directly contribute to their military capability. It also means that our trade must not be at subsidized prices or on easy credit terms. The rule should be âtrade, not aid.â
Beyond this, we should expand our economic contacts. We should sell them rope, if they want to buy it, but do so in a way that binds their hands and prevents them from reaching out to further their domination. The more we engage the Soviet Union in an intricate network of commercial relations, the more we increase its stake in peaceâand also increase its incentive to maintain good relations with us.
When the Russians marched into Afghanistan, the United States was reduced to boycotting the Olympics in Moscow and imposing a grain embargo that was meaningless because other suppliers were ready to rush in to fill the gap. We would have had more leverage if we had been trading in more things the Russians wanted.
Our leverage with trade will be minimal unless our allies in Europe and Japan join with us in developing a common policy. Acting together economically, the West is a powerful giant. Acting separately, it is an impotent giant.
For economic leverage to be
Incentives for Peace . Only when deterrence is assured candetente be effective. If the Soviets realize that aggression will not pay, they will have no choice but to behave with restraint. We can then reinforce the effect of the fear of war by providing them with the rewards of peace. Real peace requires a policy that has incentives for peace as well as disincentives for war.
Our economic power dwarfs theirs because our economic system works and theirs does not. The NATO allies and Japan outproduce the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies by a ratio of over three to one. Trade between our systems can give them an economic stake in peace and lead to greater Soviet restraint.
The Soviets need us. We know this, they know it, and we should make use of it. They are more economically dependent on us than we are on them. We largely trade Western technology for Soviet raw materials. The Soviets need access to our know-how if their economy is to grow through the end of the century. If necessary, we can go elsewhere to buy their products, but they have no alternative supplier for ours. This gives us leverage over them. We should use it to further the cause of real peace by stamping our goods with a political price tag as well as an economic one.
We should have no illusions about what trade can accomplish. Trade by itself will not produce peace or prevent war. Some contend that if we trade more with the Soviet Union, they will be less aggressive. But the Kremlin leaders cannot be bought off by trade. In the late 1970s they showed us that they would both trade and invade. At the other extreme, some contend that the increase in Soviet-American trade in the early years of detente helped fuel Soviet expansionism. This claim is preposterous. The level of trade was minuscule then; it could not possibly have affected Soviet military power. Economic relations can never substitute for deterrence. If properly implemented, they can reinforce it.
Lenin contemptuously remarked that capitalists were so short-sightedly greedy that theywould sell the communists the rope by which they themselves would someday hang. Unfortunately, some Western businessmen fit the bill. They would sell the Soviets not only rope, but also the scaffolding and a how-to book for the hangman. By refusing to look beyond the bottom line, they blithely ignore the military power the Soviets are massing on the front line.
Trade should be expanded only in ways that serve our interests. This means that we must not sell the Soviets goods and technology that directly contribute to their military capability. It also means that our trade must not be at subsidized prices or on easy credit terms. The rule should be âtrade, not aid.â
Beyond this, we should expand our economic contacts. We should sell them rope, if they want to buy it, but do so in a way that binds their hands and prevents them from reaching out to further their domination. The more we engage the Soviet Union in an intricate network of commercial relations, the more we increase its stake in peaceâand also increase its incentive to maintain good relations with us.
When the Russians marched into Afghanistan, the United States was reduced to boycotting the Olympics in Moscow and imposing a grain embargo that was meaningless because other suppliers were ready to rush in to fill the gap. We would have had more leverage if we had been trading in more things the Russians wanted.
Our leverage with trade will be minimal unless our allies in Europe and Japan join with us in developing a common policy. Acting together economically, the West is a powerful giant. Acting separately, it is an impotent giant.
For economic leverage to be
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