Real Peace by Richard Nixon Page B

effective, it must be substantial. We must have something significant to give and also to take back. We need both the carrot and the stick.
    The Soviet leaders want what the West produces, and they are willing to give up something to get it. The key is to make it very clear to them that there is an iron link between their behavior and the West’s willingness to make the trade deals they hope for.
    Soviet leaders reject explicit linkage, whether to trade or to arms control negotiations. They will not adopt the principleof linkage, but they will adapt to the fact of it. We must make them understand that linkage is a fact of international life. The American people will not support arms control and trade initiatives with the Soviet Union at a time when it is engaging in aggressive actions that threaten our interests.
    For linkage to work, however, it must be done privately. We should not make statements or take actions that will make the Soviets lose face publicly. For example, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union increased from 400 in 1968 to nearly 35,000 in 1973 as a result of the private pressure of our Administration. Congress then passed a law—the Jackson-Vanik amendment—which put the Russians on the spot publicly by tying trade to emigration policy. The number of Jews allowed to emigrate was cut in half the following year.
    Peaceful trade is totally inconsistent with the Soviet Union’s aggressive policies. I once heard President Eisenhower remark, “We should sell the Russians anything that they can’t shoot back.” When they use their economic ties with the West to finance their expansionist policies, the Soviets are in effect shooting back our assistance. The West cannot be so foolish as to subsidize its own destruction.
    During World War II, the United States recognized the importance of economic power by setting up a Board of Economic Warfare. Today we need a Foreign Economic Policy Board to concert the use of our economic power. It should answer directly to the President because only he would be able to knock heads together when the bureaucrats in the various agencies involved with foreign economic policy engage in Washington’s favorite sport: fighting for turf. Policies governing trade, foreign aid, loans, and support of international lending agencies must be coordinated to serve American foreign policy interests. A process should also be established for enlisting the cooperation of the private sector in serving those interests. It makes no sense for the government to cut off aid to hostile nations while American banks continue to make huge loans to those same nations.
    Trade is not a panacea. It does not solve all our problems.Nothing can remove the burden of deterrence from our shoulders. Our policies must be designed to take the profit out of war, but we should also put more profit into peace. On these two pillars—deterrence and detente—we can build a structure of real peace.
    Summit Meetings . Summitry between the leaders of the superpowers is indispensable in the pursuit of real peace. It is at the summit that we bring together the various strands of hard-headed detente. This is a delicate exercise that we should undertake only if progress on resolving substantive issues is assured. No American President should go to the summit unless he knows what is on the other side of the mountain.
    Rushing into a quickie summit just so the leaders of the superpowers can get acquainted would be a stupid and devastating mistake. Such a summit might temporarily improve the atmospherics of our relations, but little else. The famous “spirit of Geneva,” as well as the spirits of other Soviet-American summits at Camp David, Vienna, and Glassboro, was illusory. When a summit is all spirit and no substance, the spirit evaporates fast.
    Andropov is understandably reluctant to schedule a summit at a time when it might help President Reagan win reelection. But with the