land-based missiles. It gives them a first strike capability. We have nothing in our arsenal to counter this. Theywill have no incentive to reduce that threat through arms control negotiations unless we have a weapons system in place or in production that would at least in part match their capability. That is why it is essential for us to go forward with the MX missile. Without it, we will never be able to reach an agreement based on any semblance of equality.
The nuclear freeze is a fraud. It is a simple answer to a complex problem. We cannot expect to achieve all our goals in one negotiation, but no agreement we sign should freeze them beyond our reach.
Negotiating an arms control agreement that will contribute to real peace will take years. It is fatuous to suggest that such an agreement could be struck through a quick telephone call between an American President and Andropov. We will not be able to reach all of our goals for restoring strategic equality, increasing stability, and reducing the size of the nuclear arsenals in time for a summit meeting in 1984. But we could negotiate a substantial first step toward one or more of these goals and an agreement in principle on the others.
If significant progress is made along these lines before a summit, Presidents Reagan and Andropov when they meet could agree on long-term goals for arms control and establish a step-by-step process for reaching them. New top-level representatives, who would report directly and periodically to the Presidents, should be given the responsibility for negotiating a specific timetable.
The pieces are in place for an arms control breakthrough. The Soviets dealt themselves a strong hand by relentlessly building up their nuclear weaponry in the 1970s. By modernizing our own we have improved our hand through the draw. But we also have an ace in the hole that gives the Soviets an incentive to strike a fair deal: if there must be a nuclear arms race, we will win it through our superior economic strength and advanced technology.
After an agreement is signed, the pundits inevitably speculate about who won and who lost. But for an arms control agreement to contribute to real peace, there should be no losers,only winners. If the agreement is not to our mutual advantage, it will become politically impossible for the losing side to implement it. Unless both sides reap benefits, the process will falter.
Once we conclude arms control agreements, we must do everything they allow us to because we can be sure the Soviet Union will do so. Opponents of arms control claim that SALT I allowed the Soviets to gain nuclear superiority. The facts prove the contrary. In 1972, programs were under way to develop the B-1 bomber, the Trident II submarine, and the MX, cruise, and Minuteman III missiles. It was the Congress, not SALT I, that delayed these programs. Forty billion dollars were lopped off Administration defense budgets between 1968 and 1975. This mistake was compounded by President Carter. In his first years in office, he cancelled the B-1, delayed the MX and cruise missiles, shut down the Minuteman III production line, and cancelled the neutron bomb. The Soviets, not surprisingly, did everything SALT I permitted, stretching some provisions in the process. If we had followed a similar policy, there would be no land-based missile gap today.
While we must seek arms control agreements, we must not overestimate what they can accomplish. A bad agreement will increase the risk of war. Not even the best agreement imaginable would solve all our problems. If the United States and the Soviet Union cut their nuclear arsenals in half, a goal that is beyond the wildest dreams of even the most optimistic arms control negotiator on either side, we would still have enough weapons to destroy each other many times over. If we were to make such drastic arms reductions, a nuclear war would be just as devastating as it would be today.
If we are to reduce the risk and danger of
The nuclear freeze is a fraud. It is a simple answer to a complex problem. We cannot expect to achieve all our goals in one negotiation, but no agreement we sign should freeze them beyond our reach.
Negotiating an arms control agreement that will contribute to real peace will take years. It is fatuous to suggest that such an agreement could be struck through a quick telephone call between an American President and Andropov. We will not be able to reach all of our goals for restoring strategic equality, increasing stability, and reducing the size of the nuclear arsenals in time for a summit meeting in 1984. But we could negotiate a substantial first step toward one or more of these goals and an agreement in principle on the others.
If significant progress is made along these lines before a summit, Presidents Reagan and Andropov when they meet could agree on long-term goals for arms control and establish a step-by-step process for reaching them. New top-level representatives, who would report directly and periodically to the Presidents, should be given the responsibility for negotiating a specific timetable.
The pieces are in place for an arms control breakthrough. The Soviets dealt themselves a strong hand by relentlessly building up their nuclear weaponry in the 1970s. By modernizing our own we have improved our hand through the draw. But we also have an ace in the hole that gives the Soviets an incentive to strike a fair deal: if there must be a nuclear arms race, we will win it through our superior economic strength and advanced technology.
After an agreement is signed, the pundits inevitably speculate about who won and who lost. But for an arms control agreement to contribute to real peace, there should be no losers,only winners. If the agreement is not to our mutual advantage, it will become politically impossible for the losing side to implement it. Unless both sides reap benefits, the process will falter.
Once we conclude arms control agreements, we must do everything they allow us to because we can be sure the Soviet Union will do so. Opponents of arms control claim that SALT I allowed the Soviets to gain nuclear superiority. The facts prove the contrary. In 1972, programs were under way to develop the B-1 bomber, the Trident II submarine, and the MX, cruise, and Minuteman III missiles. It was the Congress, not SALT I, that delayed these programs. Forty billion dollars were lopped off Administration defense budgets between 1968 and 1975. This mistake was compounded by President Carter. In his first years in office, he cancelled the B-1, delayed the MX and cruise missiles, shut down the Minuteman III production line, and cancelled the neutron bomb. The Soviets, not surprisingly, did everything SALT I permitted, stretching some provisions in the process. If we had followed a similar policy, there would be no land-based missile gap today.
While we must seek arms control agreements, we must not overestimate what they can accomplish. A bad agreement will increase the risk of war. Not even the best agreement imaginable would solve all our problems. If the United States and the Soviet Union cut their nuclear arsenals in half, a goal that is beyond the wildest dreams of even the most optimistic arms control negotiator on either side, we would still have enough weapons to destroy each other many times over. If we were to make such drastic arms reductions, a nuclear war would be just as devastating as it would be today.
If we are to reduce the risk and danger of
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