concludes, “however vast the effort, to make the necessary readjustments in the logistical machinery which would insure speedy victory.” 7
The CCS never entered the dispute, for by its nature it was not a matter for the Chiefs’ intervention. At issue were two alternatives of a campaign whose object and shape they had already set and involved forces already within the theater. They were not called upon to provide reinforcements to support either the single thrust or the broad front; indeed, they had already provided more troops than Eisenhower could currently use because of supply. The individual members of the CCS followed the argument closely but did not interfere. 8
Up to a point it is difficult to see how anyone could have acted any differently. In approving MARKET-GARDEN, Eisenhower was reinforcing success, and it was not only a risk worth taking, it was almost imperative that he take it. Montgomery felt that once Eisenhower had agreed to the Arnhem operation he should have stopped Patton cold, but Montgomery should have known better than to think that Eisenhower could just cut off all Patton’s supplies. Aside from the political implications, Patton’s men had to eat, had to have replacements, had to have ammunition to defend themselves from the German counterattacks, had to have gasoline for local battlefield maneuver. It would have been impossibleto decide at exactly what point Patton was receiving more supplies than he needed for a defensive mission, and in any case the percentage of supplies that Patton did receive over his minimum needs was small.
The situation after MARKET-GARDEN was another matter. Almost all Eisenhower’s associates, British and American, agreed that the Supreme Commander was more tolerant of strong dissent from Montgomery than he should have been. In its way it was a repeat performance of GOODWOOD, when the feeling at SHAEF and among the American field commanders was that Montgomery should have been relieved. On both occasions, Eisenhower would not consider it. Eisenhower felt he had to listen to his British allies and he believed he had to grant Montgomery the right to give full expression to his views. 9
The political factors were crucial, in spite of Eisenhower’s oft-repeated assertions that he made all his decisions on military grounds. Whether or not he was technically right in insisting on a broad front, it was simply inconceivable that he should accept Montgomery’s proposition and stop U.S. troops where they were while allowing the British to make the kill. The Americans felt they had contributed at least as much to final victory as their British cousins, and they insisted on getting some of the glory. If Eisenhower had agreed to a single thrust by Twenty-first Army Group, General Marshall would have been furious. Montgomery showed no appreciation of the pressures on Eisenhower when he argued as long and as persistently as he did, but then Eisenhower’s worries were not his responsibility. Montgomery did what he had to do. So did Eisenhower.
But if Eisenhower was firm in his views he was hardly decisive in the way he communicated them to Montgomery. His patience with the field marshal was enormous and he allowed Montgomery to carry every argument to its bitter end. Even Eisenhower had a limit to his tolerance, however, and Montgomery reached it on October 10, when he wrote Smith to suggest that the trouble with MARKET-GARDEN was lack of coordination between his forces and Bradley’s. Montgomery said he should take over command of Twelfth Army Group. *
It was obvious that a crisis had been reached and the time had come to have it out with Montgomery. The reply to his suggestion, therefore, had to be just right. Eisenhower asked Whiteley to draft it, since Whiteley knew Montgomery so well; Smith then went over the letter. The result was a stronger letter than Eisenhower would have drafted himself, but after some hesitation Eisenhower approved of it and it went out over
The CCS never entered the dispute, for by its nature it was not a matter for the Chiefs’ intervention. At issue were two alternatives of a campaign whose object and shape they had already set and involved forces already within the theater. They were not called upon to provide reinforcements to support either the single thrust or the broad front; indeed, they had already provided more troops than Eisenhower could currently use because of supply. The individual members of the CCS followed the argument closely but did not interfere. 8
Up to a point it is difficult to see how anyone could have acted any differently. In approving MARKET-GARDEN, Eisenhower was reinforcing success, and it was not only a risk worth taking, it was almost imperative that he take it. Montgomery felt that once Eisenhower had agreed to the Arnhem operation he should have stopped Patton cold, but Montgomery should have known better than to think that Eisenhower could just cut off all Patton’s supplies. Aside from the political implications, Patton’s men had to eat, had to have replacements, had to have ammunition to defend themselves from the German counterattacks, had to have gasoline for local battlefield maneuver. It would have been impossibleto decide at exactly what point Patton was receiving more supplies than he needed for a defensive mission, and in any case the percentage of supplies that Patton did receive over his minimum needs was small.
The situation after MARKET-GARDEN was another matter. Almost all Eisenhower’s associates, British and American, agreed that the Supreme Commander was more tolerant of strong dissent from Montgomery than he should have been. In its way it was a repeat performance of GOODWOOD, when the feeling at SHAEF and among the American field commanders was that Montgomery should have been relieved. On both occasions, Eisenhower would not consider it. Eisenhower felt he had to listen to his British allies and he believed he had to grant Montgomery the right to give full expression to his views. 9
The political factors were crucial, in spite of Eisenhower’s oft-repeated assertions that he made all his decisions on military grounds. Whether or not he was technically right in insisting on a broad front, it was simply inconceivable that he should accept Montgomery’s proposition and stop U.S. troops where they were while allowing the British to make the kill. The Americans felt they had contributed at least as much to final victory as their British cousins, and they insisted on getting some of the glory. If Eisenhower had agreed to a single thrust by Twenty-first Army Group, General Marshall would have been furious. Montgomery showed no appreciation of the pressures on Eisenhower when he argued as long and as persistently as he did, but then Eisenhower’s worries were not his responsibility. Montgomery did what he had to do. So did Eisenhower.
But if Eisenhower was firm in his views he was hardly decisive in the way he communicated them to Montgomery. His patience with the field marshal was enormous and he allowed Montgomery to carry every argument to its bitter end. Even Eisenhower had a limit to his tolerance, however, and Montgomery reached it on October 10, when he wrote Smith to suggest that the trouble with MARKET-GARDEN was lack of coordination between his forces and Bradley’s. Montgomery said he should take over command of Twelfth Army Group. *
It was obvious that a crisis had been reached and the time had come to have it out with Montgomery. The reply to his suggestion, therefore, had to be just right. Eisenhower asked Whiteley to draft it, since Whiteley knew Montgomery so well; Smith then went over the letter. The result was a stronger letter than Eisenhower would have drafted himself, but after some hesitation Eisenhower approved of it and it went out over
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