one of the worst traffic jams in the history of the war.
Arriving in the midst of this, Lt Basil Young’s troop of B Squadron was sent forward with some infantry to reconnoitre the block. Young’s tank received a 75-mm hit which put his guns out of action, and the infantry suffered heavily.
Next, Major Bonham-Carter with B Squadron 2 RTR and 1st Gloucestershire Regiment tried to batter a way through with some artillery support. They failed as the Japanese had been particularly clever in siting their automatic weapons and two 75-mm guns which could not be reached, and because the close country limited the advance to a one tank frontage.
At this stage, the Army Commander’s presence was definitely an embarrassment, and Colonel Fosdick offered the General Lt Palmer’s troop as escort to run him through the block during the Gloucesters’ attack. To Palmer’s relief, Alexander refused the offer, preferring to stay with his troops until the issue was decided one way or the other.
An elaborate plan was made for a heavy first-light attack onthe block. A Squadron 7th Hussars would lead, with 1/10 Gurkhas and 1/11 Sikhs on the flanks, after preparation by the artillery and the RAF.
1 Situation at Taukkyon, night of 7th/8th March
A quiet night was spent by the trapped forces south of the road block. So quiet, in fact, that towards dawn Major Bonham-Carter became suspicious, and set off to examine the block and find out what the enemy was up to. Seeing no movement, he walked up to the first barrier and found it deserted. Nor could he see any sign of the enemy beyond.
Arriving back in the leaguer area, he found the attack forming up and told them the good news. Very quickly the obstruction was cleared, and the whole mass of vehicles began to move north, the Headquarters troops and refugees bound for Mandalay and beyond, the fighting troops to more suitable positions.
This episode must be one of the most remarkable in the entire history of the war. Why, when they had it in their power to capture the major part of the British fighting troops in Burma, to pull the cork out of the bottle and let the lot go free?
The answer lies in the Japanese Army’s almost insanely literal interpretation of orders, and in the all-important question of face.
The commander of the Japanese 33rd Division intended, by hook or by crook, to have the kudos of being first into Rangoon, and his plan was to cross the Rangoon–Prome road, travelling west, then swing south, and enter the city along the line of least resistance, from the north-west. To prevent interference from British troops using the main road, he had put out a company-strong flank guard at Taukkyon, and his division had crossed the road screened by their road block.
There was nothing wrong with his plan, and in fact he was in Rangoon on the morning of 8th March. The fault lay in his flank guard commander, who, whilst obviously a good tactician at the local level, lacked the imagination to see beyond his own arc of fire. The very strength of the British attacks on his position must have warned him something big was happening, and a simple patrol through the jungle alongside the road would have told him what it was. He could then have informed Division what was going on, and all Division had to do was turn east to produce a disaster comparable to Singapore. Instead, when the last of 33rd Division had crossed the road, he followed them, in accordance with his orders.
* This was Captain Plough’s battle.
3
A Long Road to a Barren Hillside
Many years after the incident at the Taukkyon road block, a troop leader of 2 RTR set down his experiences of the retreat in
The Tank
magazine, and in his account he included the following lines, composed by a tea planter at the time, concerning the plight of the refugees, most of them Indian traders and small businessmen and their dependants, who filled the roads of Burma.
They were coming in their thousands, they were streaming thro’ Tamu,
The
Arriving in the midst of this, Lt Basil Young’s troop of B Squadron was sent forward with some infantry to reconnoitre the block. Young’s tank received a 75-mm hit which put his guns out of action, and the infantry suffered heavily.
Next, Major Bonham-Carter with B Squadron 2 RTR and 1st Gloucestershire Regiment tried to batter a way through with some artillery support. They failed as the Japanese had been particularly clever in siting their automatic weapons and two 75-mm guns which could not be reached, and because the close country limited the advance to a one tank frontage.
At this stage, the Army Commander’s presence was definitely an embarrassment, and Colonel Fosdick offered the General Lt Palmer’s troop as escort to run him through the block during the Gloucesters’ attack. To Palmer’s relief, Alexander refused the offer, preferring to stay with his troops until the issue was decided one way or the other.
An elaborate plan was made for a heavy first-light attack onthe block. A Squadron 7th Hussars would lead, with 1/10 Gurkhas and 1/11 Sikhs on the flanks, after preparation by the artillery and the RAF.
1 Situation at Taukkyon, night of 7th/8th March
A quiet night was spent by the trapped forces south of the road block. So quiet, in fact, that towards dawn Major Bonham-Carter became suspicious, and set off to examine the block and find out what the enemy was up to. Seeing no movement, he walked up to the first barrier and found it deserted. Nor could he see any sign of the enemy beyond.
Arriving back in the leaguer area, he found the attack forming up and told them the good news. Very quickly the obstruction was cleared, and the whole mass of vehicles began to move north, the Headquarters troops and refugees bound for Mandalay and beyond, the fighting troops to more suitable positions.
This episode must be one of the most remarkable in the entire history of the war. Why, when they had it in their power to capture the major part of the British fighting troops in Burma, to pull the cork out of the bottle and let the lot go free?
The answer lies in the Japanese Army’s almost insanely literal interpretation of orders, and in the all-important question of face.
The commander of the Japanese 33rd Division intended, by hook or by crook, to have the kudos of being first into Rangoon, and his plan was to cross the Rangoon–Prome road, travelling west, then swing south, and enter the city along the line of least resistance, from the north-west. To prevent interference from British troops using the main road, he had put out a company-strong flank guard at Taukkyon, and his division had crossed the road screened by their road block.
There was nothing wrong with his plan, and in fact he was in Rangoon on the morning of 8th March. The fault lay in his flank guard commander, who, whilst obviously a good tactician at the local level, lacked the imagination to see beyond his own arc of fire. The very strength of the British attacks on his position must have warned him something big was happening, and a simple patrol through the jungle alongside the road would have told him what it was. He could then have informed Division what was going on, and all Division had to do was turn east to produce a disaster comparable to Singapore. Instead, when the last of 33rd Division had crossed the road, he followed them, in accordance with his orders.
* This was Captain Plough’s battle.
3
A Long Road to a Barren Hillside
Many years after the incident at the Taukkyon road block, a troop leader of 2 RTR set down his experiences of the retreat in
The Tank
magazine, and in his account he included the following lines, composed by a tea planter at the time, concerning the plight of the refugees, most of them Indian traders and small businessmen and their dependants, who filled the roads of Burma.
They were coming in their thousands, they were streaming thro’ Tamu,
The
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