young and old, infirm and fit, determined to get through,
‘Twas survival of the fittest, and downfall for the weak,
As the countless hordes pushed onward, security to seek,
From the shore of Irrawaddy, from bazaars of Mandalay,
They had clutched their goods and chattels ere they started on their way;
And along the Chindwin Valley, in Rangoon and far Moulmein,
They had seen their houses burning, they had left their kindred slain.
And many were the aged who faltered on the way,
Whose heart and nerve and sinew had known a better day;
Grim death soon claimed his victims, dread dysentery was rife,
As the multitude pressed forward, goaded on by love of life.
And many were the stragglers, who e’en with succour nigh,
Just fell out by the roadside, in loneliness to die.
The choice of Kipling’s metre is a reminder that the Soldier’s Poet should be read twice in a lifetime; once when one is young, and again, much later in life.
This, then, was the background to the longest retreat in British military history. For the time being, however, contact with the Japanese was broken, and with 2 RTR acting as rearguard, the army retired northwards to Tharrawaddy. Here, both 7th Armoured Brigade’s regiments were able to enjoy several days of much needed rest and maintenance, and afterwards carried out a number of patrols. During the next week, the withdrawal continued, first to Gyobingauk, then to Paundge, and finally to Wettigan, north-east of Prome. Here, the lull ended.
By now, the Japanese were on the move again, and had reached Paundge. Elsewhere, Chinese troops of General Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist Army had entered Burma to assist in the defence of their major supply route, the Burma Road, and were under great pressure at Toungoo, in the Sittang valley, where Japanese were also advancing. To take the pressure off the Chinese, Major-General Cowan, now commanding 17th Indian Division, was ordered to mount a spoiling attack on Paundge, and exploit towards Okpo southwards.
2 The longest retreat: the route from Rangoon to Imphal
Cowan’s plan provided for 7th Hussars, with infantry support, to smash through the enemy’s position, and for 2 RTR to leapfrog forward towards Okpo. Unfortunately, the plan had been made without any real knowledge of Japanese strength in the area, and in fact the enemy was present in considerable numbers and being reinforced constantly from the south.
On 28th March the Hussars moved down to Inma, and joined the Gloucesters, who had been in action all that day. The following morning the attack went in.
A Squadron had been detailed to capture Padigon, just north of Paundge, but found it a difficult nut to crack, losing two tanks to anti-tank guns. Lt Barton cleared a road block near the village, but came under heavy fire, and was forced to withdraw. Meanwhile, C Squadron, under Major J. Congreve, had fought their way into the village of Paundge itself, killed a number of Japanese and shot up their transport. The enemy, reinforced, had mounted a counter attack, and forced the British out, damaging two tanks and causing the infantry heavy casualties; in this action, one company of the Gloucesters was surrounded in a wood, to which the Japanese set light
At this point, with the attack already going badly, news was received that the enemy had constructed a strong road block at Shwedaung, ten miles
north
of Paundge, and were holding it with a force estimated to be between 500 and 1,000 strong. Japanese jungle mobility had been badly under-rated.
What this meant, in effect, was that 7th Armoured Brigade HQ, 7th Hussars, the infantry and artillery, were trapped, and as the column numbered some 300 vehicles, it was going to be no easy task to break out.
B Squadron, with D Troop Essex Yeomanry and two infantry companies were sent at once to start fighting their way through. Leading was Lt Palmer’s troop, with Lt Patteson’s close behind.
We moved off from Inma about 6 pm since it would be
‘Twas survival of the fittest, and downfall for the weak,
As the countless hordes pushed onward, security to seek,
From the shore of Irrawaddy, from bazaars of Mandalay,
They had clutched their goods and chattels ere they started on their way;
And along the Chindwin Valley, in Rangoon and far Moulmein,
They had seen their houses burning, they had left their kindred slain.
And many were the aged who faltered on the way,
Whose heart and nerve and sinew had known a better day;
Grim death soon claimed his victims, dread dysentery was rife,
As the multitude pressed forward, goaded on by love of life.
And many were the stragglers, who e’en with succour nigh,
Just fell out by the roadside, in loneliness to die.
The choice of Kipling’s metre is a reminder that the Soldier’s Poet should be read twice in a lifetime; once when one is young, and again, much later in life.
This, then, was the background to the longest retreat in British military history. For the time being, however, contact with the Japanese was broken, and with 2 RTR acting as rearguard, the army retired northwards to Tharrawaddy. Here, both 7th Armoured Brigade’s regiments were able to enjoy several days of much needed rest and maintenance, and afterwards carried out a number of patrols. During the next week, the withdrawal continued, first to Gyobingauk, then to Paundge, and finally to Wettigan, north-east of Prome. Here, the lull ended.
By now, the Japanese were on the move again, and had reached Paundge. Elsewhere, Chinese troops of General Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist Army had entered Burma to assist in the defence of their major supply route, the Burma Road, and were under great pressure at Toungoo, in the Sittang valley, where Japanese were also advancing. To take the pressure off the Chinese, Major-General Cowan, now commanding 17th Indian Division, was ordered to mount a spoiling attack on Paundge, and exploit towards Okpo southwards.
2 The longest retreat: the route from Rangoon to Imphal
Cowan’s plan provided for 7th Hussars, with infantry support, to smash through the enemy’s position, and for 2 RTR to leapfrog forward towards Okpo. Unfortunately, the plan had been made without any real knowledge of Japanese strength in the area, and in fact the enemy was present in considerable numbers and being reinforced constantly from the south.
On 28th March the Hussars moved down to Inma, and joined the Gloucesters, who had been in action all that day. The following morning the attack went in.
A Squadron had been detailed to capture Padigon, just north of Paundge, but found it a difficult nut to crack, losing two tanks to anti-tank guns. Lt Barton cleared a road block near the village, but came under heavy fire, and was forced to withdraw. Meanwhile, C Squadron, under Major J. Congreve, had fought their way into the village of Paundge itself, killed a number of Japanese and shot up their transport. The enemy, reinforced, had mounted a counter attack, and forced the British out, damaging two tanks and causing the infantry heavy casualties; in this action, one company of the Gloucesters was surrounded in a wood, to which the Japanese set light
At this point, with the attack already going badly, news was received that the enemy had constructed a strong road block at Shwedaung, ten miles
north
of Paundge, and were holding it with a force estimated to be between 500 and 1,000 strong. Japanese jungle mobility had been badly under-rated.
What this meant, in effect, was that 7th Armoured Brigade HQ, 7th Hussars, the infantry and artillery, were trapped, and as the column numbered some 300 vehicles, it was going to be no easy task to break out.
B Squadron, with D Troop Essex Yeomanry and two infantry companies were sent at once to start fighting their way through. Leading was Lt Palmer’s troop, with Lt Patteson’s close behind.
We moved off from Inma about 6 pm since it would be
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