activities indicating that something
significant was happening across the border in Manchuria. On October 20, the CIA sent President Truman a Top Secret Codeword
memo (which the CIA has steadfastly refused to fully declassify) revealing that SIGINT and other intelligence sources indicated
that the Chinese intended to intervene militarily in the Korean War to protect their interests in the Suiho hydroelectric
complex in North Korea. According to the report, SIGINT “noted the presence of an unusually large number of fighter aircraft
in Manchuria.” 28 The next day, October 21, AFSA reported that intercepts of Chinese radio traffic showed that during the first three weeks
of October, three Chinese armies had been deployed to positions along the Yalu River. Also on October 21, AFSA reported that
during the previous week, twenty troop trains carry ing Chinese combat troops had been sent from Shanghai to Manchuria and
more were on their way. 29
Sadly, all of this intelligence data was again ignored or discounted because it ran contrary to the prevailing wisdom of the
U.S. intelligence community. For example, the October 18, 1950, edition of the CIA’s Review of the World Situation stated, “Unless the USSR is ready to precipitate global war, or unless for some reason that Peiping leaders do not think that
war with the U.S. would result from open intervention in Korea, the odds are that Communist China, like the USSR, will not
openly intervene in North Korea.” 30 In Tokyo, MacArthur chose to ignore the SIGINT. One of MacArthur’s senior intelligence officers, Lieutenant Colonel Morton
Rubin, remembered personally briefing the general and his intelligence chief, General Charles Willoughby, on the Chinese troop
movements appearing in SIGINT, but the intelligence reports apparently did not convince either man that the Chinese threat
was real. Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, who later was to replace MacArthur as commander of U.S. forces in the Far East,
recalled that “the great fault over there was poor evaluation of the intelligence that was obtained. They knew the facts,
but they were poorly evaluated. I don’t know just why that was. It was probably in good part because of MacArthur’s personality.
If he did not want to believe something, he wouldn’t.” 31
The result was that when the Chinese launched their first offensive in Korea, it achieved complete surprise. Striking without
warning, between October 25 and November 2, 1950, three PLA armies decimated the entire South Korean 2nd Corps and a regiment
of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division near the North Korean town of Unsan. The Chinese troops then quietly withdrew back into the
hills to prepare for the next phase of their offensive. 32
After the Unsan fiasco, the entire U.S. intelligence community went into a state of denial, refusing to accept the fact that
the Chinese military was in Korea. In Washington, the CIA’s intelligence analysts concluded, “There has been no definitive
evidence of Soviet or Chinese intervention in Korea.” On October 30, the CIA’s Daily Summary opined that “the presence of Chinese Communist units in Korea has not been confirmed. CIA continues to believe that direct
Chinese Communist intervention in Korea is unlikely at this time.” In Korea, the Eighth Army reported that despite the fact
they held seven Chinese POWs, they were “not inclined to accept reports of substantial Chinese participation in North Korean
fighting.” 33
What is curious is that all the assessments coming out of the intelligence staffs in Washington and Tokyo were directly contradicted
by what the chatty Chinese POWs captured at Unsan were telling their interrogators, which was that whole Chinese combat divisions
were then operating inside Korea. 34 When CIA officers in Korea had the temerity to cable Washington with the results of the interrogations of the Chinese prisoners,
Willoughby barred CIA personnel from further access to the POW cages, telling
significant was happening across the border in Manchuria. On October 20, the CIA sent President Truman a Top Secret Codeword
memo (which the CIA has steadfastly refused to fully declassify) revealing that SIGINT and other intelligence sources indicated
that the Chinese intended to intervene militarily in the Korean War to protect their interests in the Suiho hydroelectric
complex in North Korea. According to the report, SIGINT “noted the presence of an unusually large number of fighter aircraft
in Manchuria.” 28 The next day, October 21, AFSA reported that intercepts of Chinese radio traffic showed that during the first three weeks
of October, three Chinese armies had been deployed to positions along the Yalu River. Also on October 21, AFSA reported that
during the previous week, twenty troop trains carry ing Chinese combat troops had been sent from Shanghai to Manchuria and
more were on their way. 29
Sadly, all of this intelligence data was again ignored or discounted because it ran contrary to the prevailing wisdom of the
U.S. intelligence community. For example, the October 18, 1950, edition of the CIA’s Review of the World Situation stated, “Unless the USSR is ready to precipitate global war, or unless for some reason that Peiping leaders do not think that
war with the U.S. would result from open intervention in Korea, the odds are that Communist China, like the USSR, will not
openly intervene in North Korea.” 30 In Tokyo, MacArthur chose to ignore the SIGINT. One of MacArthur’s senior intelligence officers, Lieutenant Colonel Morton
Rubin, remembered personally briefing the general and his intelligence chief, General Charles Willoughby, on the Chinese troop
movements appearing in SIGINT, but the intelligence reports apparently did not convince either man that the Chinese threat
was real. Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, who later was to replace MacArthur as commander of U.S. forces in the Far East,
recalled that “the great fault over there was poor evaluation of the intelligence that was obtained. They knew the facts,
but they were poorly evaluated. I don’t know just why that was. It was probably in good part because of MacArthur’s personality.
If he did not want to believe something, he wouldn’t.” 31
The result was that when the Chinese launched their first offensive in Korea, it achieved complete surprise. Striking without
warning, between October 25 and November 2, 1950, three PLA armies decimated the entire South Korean 2nd Corps and a regiment
of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division near the North Korean town of Unsan. The Chinese troops then quietly withdrew back into the
hills to prepare for the next phase of their offensive. 32
After the Unsan fiasco, the entire U.S. intelligence community went into a state of denial, refusing to accept the fact that
the Chinese military was in Korea. In Washington, the CIA’s intelligence analysts concluded, “There has been no definitive
evidence of Soviet or Chinese intervention in Korea.” On October 30, the CIA’s Daily Summary opined that “the presence of Chinese Communist units in Korea has not been confirmed. CIA continues to believe that direct
Chinese Communist intervention in Korea is unlikely at this time.” In Korea, the Eighth Army reported that despite the fact
they held seven Chinese POWs, they were “not inclined to accept reports of substantial Chinese participation in North Korean
fighting.” 33
What is curious is that all the assessments coming out of the intelligence staffs in Washington and Tokyo were directly contradicted
by what the chatty Chinese POWs captured at Unsan were telling their interrogators, which was that whole Chinese combat divisions
were then operating inside Korea. 34 When CIA officers in Korea had the temerity to cable Washington with the results of the interrogations of the Chinese prisoners,
Willoughby barred CIA personnel from further access to the POW cages, telling
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